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viForeword
I
n the 1990s Mexico launched a new social program—PROGRESA (now known as Opor-
tunidades). As a conditional cash transfer program, PROGRESA integrated investment in
human capital with access to a social safety net. From 1998 to 2000, the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) assisted in evaluating the program. Much of the ensuing
research is summarized in IFPRI Research Report 139 by Emmanuel Skoufias. 
Since the inception of PROGRESA, several countries, particularly in Latin America, have
implemented similar programs. One reason for the growing popularity of these programs is
that, by encompassing various dimensions of human capital, including nutritional status, health,
and education, they are able to influence many of the key indicators highlighted in national
poverty reduction strategies. One of these pilot programs, the Red de Protección Social (RPS),
modeled after PROGRESA, was begun in Nicaragua in 2000. 
IFPRI conducted a quantitative impact evaluation of this program. Findings show that the
program was effective in several domains, largely erasing differences in health-care and
schooling outcomes across expenditure groups. Moreover, the program overcame obstacles
found in the lower-income settings of Nicaragua, compared to Mexico, Colombia, or Brazil.
One unique aspect of RPS was its approach to health-care supply. Government-contracted pri-
vate providers supplied the services rather than the Ministry of Health. The results show that
such an approach can be an effective delivery mechanism in areas where government provision
might prove difficult.
In late 2002, based in part on the positive findings of the various evaluations, the govern-
ment of Nicaragua and the Inter-American Development Bank agreed to a continuation and
expansion of a modified program for three more years. IFPRI remained involved in the eval-
uation of that second phase, including a qualitative evaluation, and the results continued to
show that the program was effective in a number of important areas. Nevertheless, at this writ-
ing the future of the program is uncertain. Rigorous evaluations are important components of
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I
n recent years, investing in the human capital of the poor has been seen as crucial to alle-
viating long-term poverty. Concomitantly there is growing recognition of the need for so-
cial safety nets to protect poorer households from poverty and its consequences during the
push for economic growth. Not only are the stimulation of economic growth and investment
in social safety nets both important strategies for economic development, they are also poten-
tially complementary, because effective social safety nets may contribute directly to economic
growth via improved human capital.
Consistent with this view, several Latin American countries have introduced conditional
cash transfer programs that integrate investment in human capital with access to a social safety
net. The primary objective of these programs is to generate a sustained decrease in poverty in
some of the most disadvantaged areas. And their basic premise is that a major cause of the
intergenerational transmission of poverty is the inability of poor households to invest in the
human capital of their children. 
These programs target the poorest communities and households and condition the cash
transfers on attendance at school and health clinics. This effectively transforms cash transfers
into human capital subsidies for poor households. By encompassing various dimensions of
human capital, including nutritional status, health, and education, these programs have been
able to influence many of the key indicators highlighted in national poverty reduction strate-
gies. One early such program was PROGRESA in Mexico, begun in 1997.
Nicaragua’s RPS
Modeled after PROGRESA, the Nicaraguan Red de Protección Social (RPS) or “Social Safety
Net” is designed to address both current and future poverty via cash transfers targeted to
households living in poverty in rural Nicaragua. By targeting the transfers to poor households,
the program alleviates short-term poverty. By linking the transfers to investments in human
capital, the program addresses long-term poverty. The transfers are conditional, and house-
holds are monitored to ensure that they undertake prescribed actions intended to improve their
children’s human capital. RPS’s specific objectives include supplementing household income
for up to three years to increase expenditures on food, reducing school dropout rates during
the first four years of primary school, and increasing the health care and nutritional status of
children under five years of age.
Piloted in 2000, RPS had a budget of $11 million, representing approximately 0.2 percent
of Nicaragua’s gross domestic product or 2 percent of annual recurring government spending
on health and education. Based in part on a quantitative impact evaluation conducted by the
International Food Policy Research Institute, the Inter-American Development Bank and the
government of Nicaragua expanded the program in 2002 with a $22 million budget intended
to continue the program for an additional three years.
ixFindings of the Impact Evaluation
This research report presents the main findings of a quantitative impact evaluation of RPS
against its primary objectives. To the authors’knowledge, this RPS study is the first rigorous,
experimental evaluation of a government program in Nicaragua, and as such the main
contributions of the research are empirical. The evaluation design is based on a randomized,
community-based intervention with measurements before and after the intervention in both
treatment and control communities. 
In its pilot phase, RPS had positive and significant effects on a broad range of indicators
and outcomes. Where it did not, the lack of such effects was often due to improvements in the
control group. Nearly all estimated effects were larger for the extremely poor, often reflecting
their lower starting points. As a result, the program reduced the inequality of most outcomes
across expenditure classes.
On average, RPS supplemented total annual per capita household expenditures by 18 per-
cent, and most of this increase was spent on food. The program resulted in an average increase
of 640 Nicaraguan córdobas in annual per capita food expenditures and an improvement in the
diet of beneficiary households. Expenditures on education also increased significantly, though
there was no discernible effect on other types of investment expenditures. The economic cri-
sis experienced by these communities during the period studied enabled RPS to operate some-
what like a traditional social safety net, aiding households during a downturn.
RPS produced a massive average net increase in school enrollment of 13 percentage points
and an even larger effect of 20 percentage points on current attendance for the target popula-
tion. The number of children in grades 1–4 who advanced two grades between 2000 and 2002
increased by 7.3 percentage points, despite the fact that advancement past the fourth grade was
not a formal requirement of the program. In tandem with the increased schooling, the percent-
age of working children aged 7–13 declined by 5.6 percentage points.
Furthermore, the impact evaluation revealed an average net increase of 16 percentage points
in the participation of children under age 3 in VPCD, the health-care program. At the same
time, the services provided by the program, as measured by process indicators (including
whether the child was weighed and whether the child’s health card was updated), improved
even more. Participation by children ages 3–5 also increased substantially. As with the effects
for expenditures and schooling, average program effects for VPCD measures are larger among
poorer households.
While it was not possible to demonstrate statistically that RPS increased vaccination cov-
erage for children ages 12–23 months in the intervention group, vaccination rates did climb 30
percentage points in the intervention and control areas at a time when they were, on average,
decreasing in rural areas nationally.
Finally, the more varied household diet and increased use of preventive health-care services
for children were accompanied by an improvement in the nutritional status of beneficiary chil-
dren under age 5. The net effect was a decline of 5.5 percentage points in the number of stunted
children. This decline was more than 1.7 times faster than the rate of annual improvement seen
at the national level between 1998 and 2001. Despite improvements in the distribution of iron
supplements to these same children, however, RPS was unable to improve hemoglobin levels
or lower rates of anemia.
Conclusion
RPS has improved a number of the indicators included in the Nicaraguan national poverty re-
duction strategy, at a time when many of them were not on track to achieve the goals set out
x SUMMARYin that plan. The evidence from the evaluation strongly suggests that, if the program were to
be expanded elsewhere in the poor rural areas of Nicaragua (as it was in 2003), it would be





n recent years, increasing emphasis has been placed on the importance of human capital in
stimulating economic growth and social development. Consequently, investing in the human
capital of the poor is widely seen as crucial to alleviating poverty, particularly in the long
term. There is also growing recognition of the need for social safety nets to protect households
from poverty and its consequences during the push for economic growth (World Bank 1997).
Although at first glance stimulating economic growth and investing in social safety nets ap-
pear to be different strategies for economic development, both are important. They are also
potentially complementary, as effective social safety nets may directly contribute to economic
growth via improved human capital, particularly in the long term (Morley and Coady 2003).
Consistent with this view, several Latin American countries have introduced conditional
cash transfer programs that integrate investing in human capital with access to a social safety
net. One reason for the growing popularity of these programs is that by encompassing various
dimensions of human capital, including nutritional status, health, and education, they are able
to influence many of the key indicators highlighted in national poverty reduction strategies.
One of the first, and largest, programs was the Programa Nacional de Educación, Salud y
Alimentación (PROGRESA) in Mexico, begun in 1997. Another large program is Bolsa Ali-
mentação, a nutrition-oriented cash transfer program in Brazil. A third large program is the
Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF) in Honduras. In this report, we examine a fourth
such program, the Nicaraguan Red de Protección Social (RPS) or “Social Safety Net.”
In 2003, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), a key actor in promoting and fi-
nancing this type of program, indicated that “conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) have
replaced unrestricted cash payments and price subsidies in several Latin American countries”
(IDEA 2003, p. 1). Nancy Birdsall, president of the Center for Global Development, states: “I
think these programs are as close as you can come to a magic bullet in development....   They’re
creating an incentive for families to invest in their own children’s futures. Every decade or so,
we see something that can really make a difference, and this is one of those things.”1
The primary objective of these programs is to generate a sustained decrease in poverty in
some of the most disadvantaged regions in their respective countries. Their basic premise is
that a major cause of the intergenerational transmission of poverty is the inability of poor
households to invest in the human capital of their children. Supply-side interventions, which
increase the availability and quality of education and health-care services, are often ineffec-
tive in resolving this problem, since the resource constraints facing poor households preclude
them from incurring the private costs associated with utilizing these services (e.g., travel costs
1“To help poor be pupils, not wage earners, Brazil pays parents,” New York Times, January 3, 2004.
1and the opportunity cost of women’s and
children’s time). These programs attack this
problem by targeting transfers to the poor-
est communities and households and condi-
tioning the transfers on actions intended to
improve children’s human capital develop-
ment. This effectively transforms cash trans-
fers into human capital subsidies for poor
households.
Modeled after PROGRESA, RPS is
designed to address both current and future
poverty via cash transfers targeted to poor
households in rural Nicaragua. The transfers
are conditional, and households are moni-
tored to ensure that, among other stipula-
tions, their children are attending school
and making visits to preventive health-care
providers. When households fail to fulfill
those obligations, they lose their eligibility.
By targeting the transfers to poor house-
holds, the program alleviates short-term
poverty. By linking the transfers to invest-
ments in human capital, the program ad-
dresses long-term poverty. RPS’s specific
objectives include:
 Supplementing household income for
up to 3 years to increase expenditures
on food
 Reducing dropout rates during the first
4 years of primary school
 Increasing the health-care and nutri-
tional status of children under age 5
RPS comprised two phases over 5 years,
starting in 2000. The pilot phase (or Phase I)
lasted 3 years and had a budget of US$11
million, representing approximately 0.2
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) or
2 percent of annual recurring government
spending on health and education (World
Bank 2001, annex 21). As a condition of the
IADB loan financing the program, and to
assess whether the program merited expan-
sion in the same or in an altered form, the
Government of Nicaragua solicited various
external evaluations of Phase I. The Interna-
tional Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
conducted the quantitative impact evalua-
tion, using a randomized community-based
design. In late 2002, based in part on the pos-
itive findings of the various evaluations,2
the Government of Nicaragua and IADB
agreed to a continuation and expansion of
the program, known as Phase II, for three
more years with a budget of US$22 million.
This report presents the principal find-
ings from the quantitative impact evaluation
of Phase I of RPS for a wide range of out-
comes related to the program’s objectives,
including (1) household (food) expenditures,
(2) child schooling and child labor, (3) pre-
ventive health care of children under age 5,
and (4) nutritional status of children younger
than 5 years of age.3 Although they have a
long history and are widely used in devel-
oped countries, rigorous, large-scale, ran-
domized evaluations of social programs such
as the one reported on have been rare in
developing countries (Newman, Rawlings,
and Gertler 1994; National Research Coun-
cil 2001). Such studies have been increasing
in popularity recently, however, after the
widely cited case of PROGRESA (Raw-
lings and Rubio 2005; Skoufias 2005).
Although not new, the methodology em-
ployed in this report is generally considered
“best practice” for evaluations. Moreover,
to our knowledge, this research is the first
2 CHAPTER 1
2The findings are summarized in a policy brief available in English and Spanish (Maluccio et al. 2005). Results
reported there differ slightly from those presented in this report because of minor differences in the sample ana-
lyzed and in the methodology employed.
3In 2003, IFPRI was commissioned to carry out a qualitative evaluation. Adato and Roopnaraine (2004) present
that evaluation which includes results on many (social) dimensions of the program not contemplated here, in-
cluding program communication, empowerment, social effects of targeting, and relationships within households
and communities. The focus in the present research report is on the earlier quantitative evaluation, although we
draw on the qualitative work in some instances where the two overlap.rigorous, experimental evaluation of a gov-
ernment program in Nicaragua. The main
contributions of the research, then, are em-
pirical. The results demonstrate that the
program was effective in several domains.
Indeed, it largely erased differences in
health-care and schooling outcomes across
expenditure groups. Nicaragua is a lower-
income country when compared to Mexico,
Columbia, or Brazil, where much of the
research on conditional cash transfer pro-
grams has been done. As a result, there was
skepticism about capacity to implement the
program. Moreover, certain design features
needed to be modified for the Nicaraguan
setting. For example, because schooling
outcomes are lower, the targeted population
for school transfers was different from that
used in PROGRESA. The results show
that a conditional cash transfer program can
be effective in a low-income setting. One
unique aspect of RPS relative to most other
programs of this type was its approach to
health-care supply, in which services were
provided by government-contracted non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) rather
than directly by the Ministry of Health. The
results show that such an approach can be
an effective delivery mechanism.
INTRODUCTION 3CHAPTER 2
Design and Implementation of the 
Red de Protección Social
T
o permit an assessment of how RPS altered behavior, it is first necessary to describe
how the program operates and how it has evolved.4
Program Targeting
In the design phase of RPS, rural areas in all 17 departments of Nicaragua were eligible for
the program. The focus on rural areas reflects the distribution of poverty in Nicaragua—of the
48 percent of Nicaraguans designated as poor in 1998, 75 percent resided in rural areas (World
Bank 2001). For Phase I of RPS, the Government of Nicaragua selected the departments of
Madriz and Matagalpa from the northern part of the Central Region, on the basis of poverty
level as well as on their capacity to implement the program. This region was the only one that
showed worsening poverty between 1998 and 2001, a period during which both urban and
rural poverty rates were declining nationally (World Bank 2003). In 1998, approximately 80
percent of the rural population of Madriz and Matagalpa was poor, and half of these people
were extremely poor (IFPRI 2002). In addition, these departments had easy physical access
and communication (including being less than a one-day drive from the capital, Managua,
where RPS is headquartered), relatively strong institutional capacity and local coordination,
and reasonably good coverage of health posts and schools (Arcia 1999). By targeting purpo-
sively, RPS avoided devoting a disproportionate share of its resources in Phase I to increasing
the supply of educational and health-care services.
In the next stage of geographic targeting, all six (out of 20) municipalities that had the
small-scale participatory development program Microplanificación Participativa (Participa-
tory Micro-planning [MP]) run by the national Emergency Social Investment Fund (FISE)
were chosen.5The goal of that program was to develop the capacity of municipal governments
to select, implement, and monitor social infrastructure projects such as school and health-post
construction, with an emphasis on local participation. It is possible, then, that the selected
municipalities had atypical capacity to carry out RPS, although this may not have been wide-
spread, as MP did not completely cover the participant municipalities and it is unclear how
4Appendix A provides a descriptive chronology of activities undertaken during Phase I.
5The six were Totogalpa and Yalagüina municipalities in the department of Madriz, and Ciudad Darío, El Tuma-
La Dalia, Esquipulas, and Terrabona municipalities in the department of Matagalpa.
4successful it was. Regardless of whether
there was significant preexisting capacity,
the six municipalities were well targeted in
terms of poverty. Between 36 and 61 per-
cent of the rural population in each of the
chosen municipalities was extremely poor
and 78–90 percent was extremely poor or
poor (IFPRI 2002), compared with 21 and
45 percent, respectively, for Nicaragua as a
whole (World Bank 2003). Although not the
poorest municipalities in the country, or in
the chosen departments for that matter, the
proportion of impoverished people living in
these areas was still well above the national
average.
In the last stage of geographic targeting,
a marginality index was constructed, based
on information from the 1995 National Pop-
ulation and Housing Census, and an index
score was calculated for all 59 rural census
comarcas6 in the selected municipalities.
The index was the weighted average of a
set of comarca-level indicators (with re-
spective weights in parentheses) known to
be highly associated with poverty (Arcia
1999; Maluccio 2005):
1. Average family size (0.1)
2. Percentage without piped water in the
home or yard (0.5)
3. Percentage without a latrine (0.1)
4. Percentage of persons over age 5 who
are illiterate (0.3)
Higher index scores were associated with
more impoverished areas. Since the index
does not reliably distinguish between co-
marcas with similar scores, the 59 rural
comarcas were grouped into four priority
levels after the highest index score was re-
normalized to 100: a score of above 85 was
given highest priority (priority 1); 70–85,
priority 2; 60–70, priority 3; and below 60,
lowest priority, 4. The 42 comarcas  with
priority scores 1 and 2 were eligible for the
first stage of Phase I.7
Although the initial program design
called only for geographic targeting (with
all resident households eligible) in these 42
comarcas, about 6 percent of households
deemed to have substantial resources by RPS
were excluded ex ante from the program.8
At the outset, then, just under 90 percent of
households in intervention comarcas were
beneficiaries. Consequently, the percentage
of poor excluded from the program, or
undercoverage, was less than 5 percent in
these geographically targeted comarcas.
Moreover, because the targeted areas were
very poor, the percentage of beneficiaries
who were non-poor (i.e., leakage) was also
minimal, approximately 15 percent (IFPRI
2002). Despite these (quantitative) findings
that the program was well targeted, there
was substantial confusion at the local level
about the beneficiary selection process
(Adato and Roopnaraine 2004), raising the
possibility of community tension as the re-
sult of excluding some families.
Program Design
RPS has two core components: (1) food
security, health, and nutrition and (2) ed-
ucation.
Each eligible household9 received a cash
transfer known as the bono alimentario or
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6Census comarcas are administrative areas within municipalities that typically include between one and five
small communities averaging 100 households each. They are comprised of census segments and determined by
the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses and in some cases do not coincide with locally defined areas also
referred to as comarcas.
7IFPRI (2002) and Maluccio (2005) provide further details on the RPS targeting methodology.
8Appendix B describes how households were determined ineligible.
9RPS defined a household as a group of persons habitually living, eating, and cooking together. The same defi-
nition was used in all the survey work.“food security transfer”10 every other month,
contingent on attendance at educational
workshops held every other month and on
bringing their children under age 5 for
scheduled preventive (or well child) health-
care appointments with specially contracted
providers. The workshops were held within
the communities and typically included
about 20 participants. They covered house-
hold sanitation and hygiene, nutrition, re-
productive health, breastfeeding, and related
topics. To ensure adequate supply in these
poor, rural communities, RPS trained and
paid private providers to deliver the specific
health-care services required by the pro-
gram. RPS adapted the individual counsel-
ing material from the Integrated Attention to
the Child (AIN) program in Honduras (Van
Roekel et al. 2000). These services, provided
free of charge to beneficiary households, in-
cluded growth and development monitoring,
vaccination, and provision of antiparasite
medicine, vitamins, and iron supplements.
Children younger than age 2 were seen
monthly and those ages 2–5, every other
month. In practice, mothers brought their
children to the local service location (typi-
cally a community center or house of one of
the beneficiaries) to be seen by the health-
care team working for the private provider.
The prescribed procedure was the follow-
ing. First, the professional nurse measured
the child, inquired about the child’s health
and the caretaker’s caring and feeding prac-
tices, and checked the vitamin Asupplemen-
tation record. Then the doctor examined the
child, prescribing appropriate antiparasite
medicine or iron supplements according to
the Ministry of Health protocol for making
these prescriptions. If the child was growing
well, the doctor congratulated the caretaker.
Then the caretaker returned to the nurse to
receive individual counseling on how to
maintain or improve growth, with key mes-
sages on breastfeeding, child feeding, illness
care, and hygiene, taking into account sev-
eral factors, such as the age of the child,
whether the child had gained weight ade-
quately the previous month, and whether
the child had been ill.
Each eligible household also received
a cash transfer known as the bono escolar
or “school attendance transfer” every other
month, contingent on enrollment and regu-
lar school attendance of children ages 7–13
who had not completed fourth grade of pri-
mary school. In addition, for each eligible
child, the household received an annual cash
transfer intended for school supplies (in-
cluding uniforms and shoes) known as the
mochila escolar or “school supplies trans-
fer,” which was contingent on enrollment.
Unlike the school attendance transfer, which
was a fixed amount per household regard-
less of the number of children in school, the
school supplies transfer was for each child.
To provide incentives to the teachers,
who had some additional reporting duties
and were likely to have larger classes after
the introduction of RPS, and to increase
resources available to the schools, there was
also a small cash transfer, known as the
bono a la oferta or “teacher transfer.”11 This
was given to each beneficiary child, who in
turn delivered it to the teacher. The teacher
kept one half, while the other half was ear-
marked for the school. The delivery of the
funds to the teacher was monitored, but not
their ultimate use.
Table 2.1 summarizes the eligibility re-
quirements and demand and supply-side ben-
efits of RPS. At the outset, nearly all house-
6 CHAPTER 2
10One common definition for food security is “when all people at all times have both the physical and economic
access sufficient to meet their dietary needs to lead a healthy and productive life” (USAID 1992). In this report,
we do not formally assess food security, however, but focus on indicators of food expenditures that are associated
with food security.
11In rural Nicaragua, school’s parents’associations often request small monthly contributions from parents to sup-
port the teacher and the school; the teacher transfer was, in part, intended to substitute any such fees.holds were eligible for the food security
transfer, which was a fixed amount per
household, regardless of household size.
Households with children ages 7–13 who
had not yet completed the fourth grade of
primary school were also eligible for the
education component of the program.
The amounts for each transfer were ini-
tially determined in U.S. dollars and then
converted into Nicaraguan córdobas (C$) in
September 2000, just before RPS began dis-
tributing transfers. Table 2.1 shows the orig-
inal U.S. dollar annual amounts and their
Nicaraguan córdoba equivalents (using the
September 2000 average exchange rate of
C$12.85 to US$1). The food security trans-
fer was US$224 a year and the school at-
tendance transfer US$112.12 On its own,
the food security transfer represented about
13 percent of total annual household ex-
penditures in beneficiary households before
the program. A household with one child
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12IADB calculated the transfer amounts taking into account the extreme poverty gap, that is, the difference be-
tween the extreme poverty line and the average level of expenditures of the extremely poor reported in the 1998
LSMS (World Bank 2001). The 1998 daily per capita extreme poverty line (calculated to enable the purchase of
a minimum requirement food basket) is US$0.58 and the extreme poverty gap, US$0.18. For comparison, the
1998 daily per capita poverty line is US$1.12. The amount for the school attendance transfer was calculated using
an approximation of the opportunity cost of children multiplied by the average number of children ages 7–13 in
households in extreme poverty. The sum of the food and school attendance transfers was an estimated average
daily transfer of US$0.12, an amount designed to fill two-thirds of the average extreme poverty gap for extremely
poor households.
Table 2.1 Nicaraguan RPS eligibility and benefits in Phase I
Program components
Food security, health, and nutrition Education
Eligibility
Geographic All  householdsa All householdsa with children ages 7–13 who 
targeting have not yet completed fourth grade of 
primary school
Demand-side benefits
Monetary  Bono alimentario  Bono escolar 
transfers (food security transfer) (school attendance transfer)




C$275 per child beginning of school year
(US$21)
Supply-side benefits
Services  Health education workshops Bono a la oferta
provided   every 2 months (teacher transfer)
and  Child growth and monitoring C$80 per child per year given 
monetary Monthly: Newborn to 2-year-olds to teacher/school (US$6)
transfers Every 2 months: 2- to 5-year-olds
Provision of antiparasite medicine, 
vitamins, and iron supplements
Vaccinations (newborn to 5-year-olds)
aAs described in Appendix B, a small percentage of households were excluded a priori.benefiting from the education component
would have received additional transfers of
about 8 percent, yielding an average total
potential transfer of 21 percent of total an-
nual household expenditures. Over the 2
years, the actual average monetary transfer
(excluding the teacher transfer) was approx-
imately C$3,500 (US$272 or 17 percent of
total annual household expenditures). This
is approximately the same percentage of
total annual household expenditures as the
average transfer in PROGRESA, but more
than five times as large as the transfers given
in PRAF (Caldés, Coady, and Maluccio
2004). In contrast to PROGRESA, which
indexes transfers to inflation, the nominal
value of the transfers remained constant for
RPS, with the consequence that the real
value of the transfers declined by about 8
percent as a result of inflation over 2 years
in Phase I. It is possible that any differences
in the effectiveness of RPS over time re-
sulted, in part, from a decline in the real
value of the transfers, although such effects
are likely to be small.
The value of the supply-side services, as
measured by how much RPS paid to the
providers, was also substantial. On an an-
nual basis, the education workshops cost
approximately US$50 per beneficiary and
the health-care services for children under
age 5, approximately US$110, including the
value of the vaccines, antiparasite medicine,
vitamins, and iron supplements, all of which
were provided by the Ministry of Health.
To enforce compliance with program re-
quirements, beneficiaries did not receive the
food or education component(s) of the trans-
fer if they failed to carry out any of the con-
ditions listed in Table 2.2. The monitoring
was done using the management informa-
tion system (MIS) designed specifically for
and by RPS. It comprised a continuously up-
dated, relational database of beneficiaries,
health-care providers, and schools. The MIS
was also used to (1) select beneficiaries and
prepare invitations to program incorporation
assemblies, (2) calculate transfer amounts,
(3) compile requests to the Ministry of
Health for vaccines and other materials,
and (4) monitor whether health-care service
providers were meeting their responsibili-
ties. Decision rules capturing the require-
ments in Table 2.2 were programmed di-
rectly into the MIS. Data forms for the
various program participants were designed
to feed into this system (including the house-
hold registry or census forms, school forms,
and health-care provider forms that were all
sent to the main office where they were en-
tered into the computer).
Table 2.2 shows the four different
“types” of beneficiary households in the
program, who received different transfers
and had to fulfill different requirements.
Households with no children in the targeted
age ranges were eligible only for the food
security transfer but, at the same time,
needed only to attend the health education
workshops to qualify for continued receipt
of the transfers. Households with children
under age 5 (but without children ages 7–13
who had not completed the fourth grade)
were also eligible for the food security
transfer only, but had more requirements to
fulfill, related to their young children.
Households with children ages 7–13 who
had not completed the fourth grade were
eligible for both the food security and educa-
tion transfers and were required to comply
with the education-related conditions. To
receive the education transfers, all target chil-
dren had to comply; if one complied but an-
other did not, the household did not receive
the transfer. If, in addition, the household
included children younger than age 5, the
household was eligible for the same trans-
fers but had more requirements to fulfill, in
particular, those related to the health con-
trols for young children. About 20 percent
of the households had no targeted children,
25 percent only children under age 5, 20 per-
cent only children ages 7–13, and the re-
maining 35 percent both children younger
than 5 years and 7- to 13-year-olds.
RPS allowed this latter type of house-
hold to receive a partial transfer if it com-
plied with the health-care requirements and
8 CHAPTER 2not the education requirements or vice
versa. During the first 2 years of transfers,
approximately 10 percent of beneficiaries
were penalized at least once and therefore
did not receive, or received only one com-
ponent of, their transfer. It was also possible
for households to be expelled from the
program. Reasons for expulsion included
(1) repeated failure to comply with pro-
gram requirements, (2) failure to collect the
transfer in two consecutive periods, (3) more
than 27 unexcused school absences during
the school year per beneficiary child, (4)
failure of a beneficiary child to be promoted
to the next grade, and (5) discovery of false
reporting of information during any part of
data collection, including information about
fulfillment of program responsibilities.13
Fewer than 1 percent of households were
expelled during the first 2 years of transfers,
although approximately 5 percent left the
program voluntarily, for example, by drop-
ping out or migrating out of the program
area.
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13When it was learned that some, but not all, schools practiced automatic promotion, enforcement of the grade
promotion condition was deemed unfair and therefore was never enforced. Similarly, when there were some de-
lays in the delivery of vaccines, the up-to-date vaccination condition was also never enforced. A third condition,
punishment of children who did not have adequate weight gain, was dropped at the end of the Phase I because of
a concern about the role of measurement error and the finding that the poorest households were more likely to be
punished. These changes highlight the importance of careful consideration of the required responsibilities and
how they are to be monitored during the design of a conditional cash transfer program. They also show the im-
portance of flexibility during program implementation.




with no Households ages 7–13 who have
targeted with children not completed
children ages 0–5 fourth grade
Program requirement (A) (B) (C) (B) + (C)
Attend health education workshops every   
2 months
Bring children to prescheduled health- 
care appointments
Monthly (0–2 years)
Every 2 months (2–5 years)
Adequate weight gain for children  
younger than 5 yearsa
Enrollment in grades 1–4 of all targeted  
children in the household
Regular attendance (85 percent, i.e., no  
more than 5 absences every 2 months 
without valid excuse) of all targeted 
children in the household
Promotion at end of school yearb 
Deliver teacher transfer to teacher 
Up-to-date vaccination for all children  
under 5 yearsb
aThe adequate weight gain requirement was discontinued in Phase II starting in 2003.
bCondition was not enforced.Only the designated household repre-
sentative could collect the cash transfers
and, where possible, RPS designated the
mother as that representative. The dominant
reason for not selecting a woman was that
either she was not living in the household or
was not alive. This strategy mimics the de-
sign of PROGRESAand PRAF and is based
on evidence that resources in the hands of
women often lead to better outcomes for
child well-being and household food secu-
rity (Strauss and Thomas 1995). As a result,
more than 95 percent of the household
representatives selected were women. These
representatives attended the health educa-
tion workshops and they were responsible
for ensuring that the requirements for their
households were fulfilled.
Although centrally administered, with
its multisectoral approach across education,
health, and nutrition, RPS required bureau-
cratic cooperation at the national, municipal,
and community levels. Given funding and
administrative oversight from FISE during
Phase I, municipal planning and coordination
was conducted by committees composed
of delegates from the health and education
ministries, representatives from civil soci-
ety, and RPS personnel. This coordination
proved important in directing supply-side
responses to increased household demand
for health and schooling services. At the
comarca level, RPS representatives worked
with local volunteer representatives known
as promotoras (beneficiary women chosen
by the community), and local schools and
health-care service providers, to implement
the program. The promotoras were charged
with keeping beneficiary household rep-
resentatives informed about upcoming
health-care appointments for their children,
upcoming transfers, and any failures in ful-
filling the conditions. Each promotora
had, on average, 17 (SD 6) beneficiaries in
her charge, although this average masked
substantial variation ranging from 5 to 30
beneficiaries.
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Design of the Evaluation, 
Methodology, and Validity
T
o measure program effects, it is necessary to know what would have happened had
the program not been implemented. The fundamental problem, of course, is that an
individual, household, or geographic area cannot simultaneously undergo and not un-
dergo an intervention. Therefore, it is necessary to construct a counterfactual measure of what
would have happened if the program had not been available. The most powerful way to con-
struct a valid counterfactual is to randomly select beneficiaries from a pool of equally eligible
candidates.
Evaluation Design and Double-Difference Methodology
The evaluation for RPS was based on a randomized, community-based intervention with
measurements before and after the intervention in both treatment and control communities.
One half of the 42 comarcas (targeted in the first stage of Phase I as described in the first sec-
tion of Chapter 2) were randomly selected into the program. Thus, there are 21 comarcas in
the intervention group and 21 distinct comarcas in the control group (IFPRI 2001a). Given the
geography of the program area, however, control and intervention comarcas are in some cases
adjacent to one another. Including a control from whom treatment was withheld was ethical
because the effectiveness of the intervention was unknown and it was uncertain there was suf-
ficient capacity to implement the intervention in all areas at once. In this case, random selec-
tion would seem to be about as fair as any other arbitrary decision rule for selecting the first
set of beneficiaries.
The selection was done at a public event in which representatives from the comarcas, the
Government of Nicaragua, IADB, IFPRI, and the media were present. The 42 comarcas were
ordered by their marginality index scores and stratified into seven groups of six comarcas
each. Within each stratum, randomization was achieved by blindly drawing one of six colored
balls without replacement (starting with three blue for intervention and three white for con-
trol) from a box after the name of each comarca was called out. Thus, three comarcas from
each group were randomly selected for inclusion in the program, while the other three were
selected as controls. The evaluation was designed to last for 1 year—that is, the control group
was meant to be a control for only 1 year, after which it was expected there would be capacity
to implement the intervention everywhere.14 Because of delays in funding for RPS as a result
of a governmental audit unrelated to the program, incorporation of households in the control
14As a result, another way to describe the experiment is that the program was randomly phased in.
11comarcas into the program was postponed
until 2003, extending the possible length of
the treatment–control evaluation by more
than a year. In the end, control comarcas
waited a little over 2 years before being fully
incorporated into the program during its
second phase. Even with this extension, how-
ever, the evaluation remains an evaluation
of the short-term effects of the program
(Thomas et al. 2003), although in some cases
the effects on long-term indicators, such as
child anthropometrics, are measured.
During the public selection, local leaders
and government officials were informed
generally about the program. This included
that they were told that control comarcas
would enter the program after 1 year (al-
though as just described, 1 year turned into
2). This was done to ensure participation in
the evaluation. While RPS did not publicize
this plan to households in control comarcas,
it would be naive to assume that households
in control areas were entirely unaware of it.
Over time they certainly would have learned
about such a large program in neighboring
villages and may even have been informed
by local actors about their eventual possible
participation. Some implications of this form
of contamination for the experiment and in-
terpretation of results are discussed later in
this chapter.
Household and individual level data were
collected in both the intervention and con-
trol comarcas before and after RPS was
implemented. This enables the use of the
double-difference method to calculate “av-
erage program impact.”15 The resulting
measures can be interpreted as the expected
effect of implementing the program in a
similar population elsewhere, subject to a
number of caveats described below. The
method is shown in Table 3.1 (which pre-
sents the basic format for all the results
presented in this report). The columns distin-
guish between groups with and without the
program (denoted by I for intervention and
C for control), and the rows distinguish be-
tween before and after the program (denoted
by subscripts 0 and 1). Anticipating one of
the analyses presented below, consider the
measurement of school enrollment rates for
children. Before the program, one would
expect the average percentage enrolled to be
similar for the two groups, so that the quan-
tity (I0 – C0) would be close to zero. Once
the program has been implemented, how-
ever, one would expect differences between
the groups as a result of the program. Fur-
thermore, because of the random assign-
ment, one would expect the difference (I1 –
C1) to measure the effect directly attributa-
ble to the program. Indeed, (I1 – C1) is a
valid measure of the average program effect
under this design. Amore robust measure of
the effect, however, would account for any
preexisting observable or unobservable dif-
ferences between the two randomly assigned
groups: this is the double-difference esti-
mate obtained by subtracting the preexisting
differences between the groups, (I0 – C0),
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Table 3.1 Calculation of the double-difference estimate of average program effect
Intervention group Control group Difference
Survey round with RPS program without RPS program across groups
Follow-up I1 C1 I1 – C1
Baseline I0 C0 I0 – C0
Difference across time I1 – I0 C1 – C0 Double-difference
(I1 – C1) – (I0 – C0)from the difference after the program has
been implemented, (I1 – C1).
An alternative interpretation of the
double-difference estimator emerges if one
first considers the differences within the (in-
tervention or control) groups. This approach
begins with a reflexive estimator of the pro-
gram effect, the difference over time for the
intervention group, (I1 – I0). It is a poten-
tially biased estimator because it includes
all changes over time in enrollment rates in
the intervention group, regardless of what
causes them. For example, if increases in
public investment nationally were improv-
ing school access and leading to changes in
enrollment, these effects would show up in
the difference over time in the intervention
group, in addition to the effects attributable
to the program. The obvious measure for
the non-program-related change over time
in the intervention group is the change over
time in the control group, (C1 – C0). Thus
the average program effect is estimated by
first considering the total change over time
in the intervention group, and then subtract-
ing from this the change over time in the
control group. As above, this yields the
double-difference estimator.
The alternative interpretation is probably
best illustrated graphically, as in Figure 3.1.
For an arbitrary indicator measured over time,
it is assumed (for the graph) that as a result
of the randomization, both the intervention
and control groups start at the same level
(on the vertical axis). No change in the indi-
cator over time would lead to the outcome
depicted by point I0= C0in 2002; if only the
intervention group were being followed,
one would then naively calculate the effect
of the program as I1 – I0. However, as the
control group makes clear, there was a trend
over time that led to an improvement (in this
example) of C1 –  C0. Estimates ignoring
this would overstate the effect of the pro-
gram. Instead, the correct estimate of the
program effect is I1 – C1; this is the double-
difference estimate since I0 = C0. In the case
where the trend line for the control group
was declining, ignoring that effect would
tend to understate the program effect.16
For this work, the double-difference
technique is extended to account for three
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Baseline Follow-upmeasurements taken in 2000, 2001, and
2002. The basic estimating equation is
shown in equation (1).
Eict = α0 + α1Y1 + α2Y2 + α3Pc +
δ1Y1Pc + δ2Y2Pc + µic + νict (1)
where
Eict = outcome variable of interest for
individual (or household) i in co-
marca c at time t
Y1 = (1) if year 2001
Y2 = (1) if year 2002
Pc = (1) if program intervention in 
comarca c
µic = all (observed and unobserved) 
individual-, household-, or comarca-
level time-invariant factors
νict = unobserved idiosyncratic 
individual-, household-, or comarca-
level and time-varying error
All the α and δ are unknown parameters.
The key parameters of interest are δ1
and δ2; δ1 is the double-difference estimator
of the average program effect for 2001 (rel-
ative to 2000) and δ2 for 2002 (relative to
2000). The program effects are identified by
the randomized design. Given the random-
ization of Pc, it (and any interactions in-
volving it) is uncorrelated with all observed
or unobserved individual-, household-, or
comarca-level variables so that the δs can
be consistently estimated. It is not necessary
to include other variables in this regression
for the consistency of the estimator for δ1
and δ2, although doing so increases the pre-
cision of the estimates.
Since we do not condition on the house-
hold-level decision to participate in RPS but
instead only on whether the program was
available in the household’s comarca, this
framework yields what is commonly referred
to as an estimate of the intent-to-treat effect.
The estimator is not subject to selection
biases associated with the decision to par-
ticipate in the program since it relies only on
the randomized design. About 10 percent of
the households in the intervention areas
were either excluded by RPS or chose not
to participate in the program. Survey sam-
ple households in this subgroup are not pro-
gram beneficiaries so that basing estimates
on the sample that includes them “dilutes”
the estimated effects of the program. The
intent-to-treat methodology we use is con-
servative, then, relative to measuring the
effect of the treatment on the treated. To es-
timate the effect of the treatment on the
treated, rather than estimating the double-
difference, one would instead have to en-
dogenize the participation decision, most
likely using the random program placement
as an instrumental variable. This approach
amounts to rescaling the intent-to-treat esti-
mates by the fraction of program partici-
pants. Since the participation rates are rela-
tively high, it does not yield very different
estimates, so we do not present them.
To assess differences in effects for the
poor and non-poor for the analyses consid-
ered below, we also classify households into
three household expenditure (or poverty)
groups—extremely poor, poor (but not ex-
tremely poor), and non-poor—based on their
preprogram per capita annual total household
expenditures (including own-production)
measured in 2000 and using 2001 national
poverty lines developed by the World Bank
(World Bank 2003). Double-difference esti-
mates were calculated within each poverty
group and when they differ across the groups
are discussed in the text and presented in
some of the tables.
In the double-difference analyses that fol-
low, only households interviewed in all three
survey rounds, that is, the balanced panel
sample, are included. Standard errors are
calculated allowing for heteroskedasticity
and for clustering at the comarca level
(StataCorp 2001). For simplicity, we do not
control, for example, for the fact that the
randomization was at the comarca level—
so-called  “community effects.” When we
do control for community effects or when
we do not control for heteroskedasticity and
comarca-level clustering, the precision of
14 CHAPTER 3nearly all the estimates increases, leading to
stronger statistical significance. The estima-
tions that follow also ignore the stratified
sample design which can be corrected for
statistically by using comarca-level sample
weights; correcting for this aspect of the
design makes no substantive changes to the
estimated effects.
Issues and Concerns
Related to the 
Experimental Design
The value of randomized evaluations is
widely recognized. When done well, recipi-
ents and nonrecipients will have, on aver-
age, the same observed and, more important
(since they are more difficult to control for),
unobserved, characteristics. As a result, they
establish a credible basis for comparison,
freed from selectivity concerns, and the di-
rection of causality is certain. Nonrandom-
ized approaches, on the other hand, typically
rely on assumptions that are often hard to
believe and almost always hard to verify
(Burtless 1995).17 A further advantage to a
randomized design is that program impact
is easy to calculate and, as a consequence,
easier to understand and explain.
Of course, randomized evaluations are
not a panacea. For example, they can be
costly (both financially and politically) and
often one must wait years for results, making
them less useful for pressing policy deci-
sions. Moreover, randomized design evalu-
ations can provide only partial answers to
some important questions. This is often re-
ferred to as their “black box” nature. The
evaluation only allows us to assess most
rigorously the effect of the program (or pro-
gram components) that it was explicitly de-
signed to assess.18 Without further model-
ing and assumptions (not already explicit
to the evaluation design), we are in the dark
if we want to consider how even slightly
changing the program alters the effect on
the outcomes under consideration. For ex-
ample, RPS provided a package of services
in which all households were eligible for the
food security transfer, regardless of whether
they also received the educational transfers.
Using only the randomized design on its
own, it is difficult to tease apart the effects
of the education component of the program
from the nutrition component—all the ob-
served effects, even those that pertain specif-
ically to educational outcomes, are the re-
sult of the program as a whole. Similarly, it
is difficult to assess the relative importance
of the demand-side stimulus versus the
supply-side interventions for the observed
improvements in health care—all the ob-
served effects reflect the combination of
supply- and demand-side influences. Nor
can we easily and reliably assess what the
effect of the program would be if the size of
any one of the transfers were to change, as
they did when RPS was expanded in 2003.
While in this report we focus primarily
on findings that derive directly from the ex-
perimental design, extensions to the analy-
sis that begin to address the issues raised
above or others are possible areas for future
research. For example, the design feature
that RPS, in contrast to most other programs
of this type, offers household-level educa-
tion transfers as opposed to child-level trans-
fers, provides the opportunity to explore the
effect of varying the transfer per benefici-
ary by comparing households with different
numbers of school children. Indirectly, this
would be an assessment of the effect of
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17There is a recent increase in non-experimental approaches to evaluation, in particular using propensity score
matching. The evidence is mixed, however, as to whether or not these provide a convincing alternative to exper-
imental approaches (Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith 1999; Michalopolous, Bloom, and Hill 2004).
18Furthermore, because by design some members of society remain without the intervention, such evaluations can
only measure partial equilibrium effects of the program, which may be different from the general equilibrium ef-
fects, for example, if the program were national (Heckman, Lochner, and Taber 1998).varying the transfer size. Similarly, the dif-
ferent starting dates for the education and
health components of the program (described
below) could be exploited to investigate
the relative importance of each of them.19
Finally, using variation in availability or
quality of schooling could provide an op-
portunity to separate demand- and supply-
side effects on improvements in schooling
(Coady and Parker 2004).
Even a well-implemented randomized
design, however, is not without potential
weaknesses. Heckman and Smith (1995)
highlight that the apparent simplicity can
be deceiving, particularly in poorly designed
evaluations where contamination occurs as
a result of (1) randomization bias, where the
process of randomization itself leads to a
different beneficiary pool than would other-
wise have been treated; (2) anticipation ef-
fects, where control group behavior changes
as the result of changes in expectations; or
(3) substitution bias, where nonbeneficiaries
obtain similar treatments from different
sources. There is little reason to believe that
the first consideration (randomization bias)
is a concern in the RPS evaluation; for ex-
ample, there was no evidence that house-
holds moved in part or in whole to obtain
the program (Adato and Roopnaraine 2004).
The fourth section of this chapter addresses
the possibility of contamination of the
control group suggested by the other two
concerns.
Another limitation with randomized eval-
uations, or nearly any other evaluation for
that matter, is that the results pertain specif-
ically to the study population—extrapolating
them to other populations requires addi-
tional assumptions that may not be easy to
verify (Burtless 1995). This is typically re-
ferred to as the external validity problem. In
the case of RPS, the purposive selection of
program areas may have affected program
performance; the generalizability of the re-
sults is therefore less certain. As described
earlier, the selection of municipalities was
conditioned on the likelihood of success, so
that the observed outcomes might exagger-
ate the likely outcomes from program ex-
pansion to other areas with, for example,
weaker institutional capacity to implement
the program. On the other hand, the ob-
served outcomes may understate the likely
outcomes if there was less need for RPS in
these areas because of greater institutional
capacity.
While it is not possible to claim that the
42 selected comarcas are representative of
rural Nicaragua, there is evidence that they
are similar in many key respects to a large
number of other rural communities in the
Central Region and in the country more
broadly. First, using the marginality index
scores based on the 1975 census (Arcia
1999), we estimate that three quarters of
the approximately 150 rural comarcas in the
departments of Madriz and Matagalpa have
priority 1 or 2, as do three quarters of the
approximately 1,000 rural comarcas in the
country as a whole. If instead we consider
levels of extreme poverty, there are more
than 350 comarcas in the country with ex-
treme poverty at or above 42 percent, the
average level in the pilot areas. On these
broad indicators used for geographical tar-
geting, then, there are a large number of
similar comarcas, indicating those chosen
for the pilot were not atypical.
A final problem to bear in mind when
interpreting the results in this analysis is that
the program was in its pilot phase, and out-
comes (and therefore estimated effects) for
the pilot may differ from outcomes for an
expanded or longer-running program. Like
most pilots, RPS underwent an initial learn-
ing period (with attendant setbacks) and
undertook a variety of activities that might
not need repeating in an expansion (e.g.,
designing the MIS and preparing training
materials for beneficiaries, promotoras, and
health-care providers). Some of these activ-
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effectiveness during the pilot (Caldés and
Maluccio 2005). Moreover, as with any new
program, there was the potential for ob-
served behavioral changes to result, in part,
from the novelty of the program or the
evaluation—the Hawthorne effect (Krueger
1999). There are some patterns consistent
with this phenomenon when we compare
the effects after 1 year (2000–01) with those
after 2 years (2000–02). Estimated effects
on several outcome indicators were slightly
lower in 2002 than in 2001, and not always
entirely attributable to improvements in the
control group. Unfortunately, we cannot
directly test how much of this might be due
to a Hawthorne effect, changes in the effec-
tiveness of program implementation, or the
slight decline in the real value of transfers.
Finally, expansion of the program could in-
troduce new advantages and disadvantages
associated with scaling up and economies
of scale. All these factors call for a degree of
caution in forecasting what would happen
were the program to be extended to other
municipalities in Nicaragua.
Data Collection
The data collected for the evaluation were
an annual household panel data survey im-
plemented in both intervention and control
areas of RPS before the start of the program,
in 2000, and after the program began opera-
tions, in 2001 and 2002.20Acomprehensive
household questionnaire based on the 1998
Nicaraguan Living Standards Measurement
Survey (LSMS) was used (World Bank
2001). The LSMS questionnaire was ex-
panded in some areas (e.g., child health and
education) to ensure that all the program
indicators were captured, but cut in other
areas (e.g., income from labor and other
sources) to minimize respondent burden and
ensure collection of high-quality data in a
single interview.21An anthropometric mod-
ule for children younger than age 5 was im-
plemented in 200022 and 2002, although not
in 2001. In this module, height (or length),
weight, and hemoglobin (using portable
Hemocue machines) were measured, follow-
ing standard international procedures.
The household survey sample is a strat-
ified (at the comarca level) random sample
of all 42 comarcas described above and
using the RPS population census collected
in May 2000 as the sample frame. The areas
represented comprise a relatively poor part
of the rural Central Region in Nicaragua,
but the sample is not statistically representa-
tive of the six municipalities or other areas
of Nicaragua, for that matter. Forty-two
households were randomly selected in each
of the 42 comarcas, yielding an initial target
sample of 1,764 households. The sample size
calculation was based on assessing the nec-
essary sample sizes for the indicators listed
in Appendix C. Assuming a random sample,
a significance level of 5 percent, and a
power of 80 percent, the indicator that re-
quired the largest sample size was enroll-
ment for grades 1–4. To detect a minimum,
statistically significant difference of 8 per-
centage points between intervention and con-
trol groups, a sample size of 549 students
for each group was required. Of course, not
all households had children in this age
range. According to the 2000 RPS popula-
tion census, 63 percent of households had
at least one child between 6 and 12 years
of age. Therefore, to obtain a sample of 549
children (in different households) it was nec-
essary to interview 871 households in each
group (549/0.63), or 1,742 in total. Thus,
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20Results reported on here are based on the April 2005 release of the Nicaraguan RPS evaluation data, available
from IFPRI.
21LSMS surveys are typically implemented in two visits to the household (Grosh and Glewwe 2000).
22About one-half of the 2000 anthropometry survey had to be completed in early October, one month after the
main survey, owing to delays in getting all the necessary equipment and supplies for hemoglobin testing.the target sample was calculated as 1,764
households (42 households in each of the 42
comarcas).23 The first wave of fieldwork
was carried out in late August and early Sep-
tember 2000, without replacement—that is,
when it was not possible to interview a se-
lected household, another household was
not substituted.
Although there was a great deal of
progress in getting RPS started throughout
2001, it was not possible to design and im-
plement all the components according to the
original timelines. In particular, the health-
care component was not initiated until June
2001. This delay occurred because it took
longer than originally planned to design the
intervention and to select, contract, and train
the NGO and private health-care providers.
There were also delays in the delivery of
transfers to households because of a gov-
ernmental audit that effectively froze RPS
funds. As a result, the RPS 2001 follow-up
survey was delayed until the beginning of
October, to allow additional time for the
interventions to take root and for five of the
scheduled six transfers to be effected. Of
course, the advantage of the original design,
with the scheduled RPS follow-up at exactly
the same time of year as the 2000 baseline,
was that it would enable one to control bet-
ter for possible seasonal variations in con-
sumption and health. The change in survey
date should have little effect on schooling,
however, since the school year begins in
late January and ends in November. With a
control group, the possible bias introduced
by seasonality is addressed by differencing
across intervention and control groups. This
difference in the timing of the survey, then,
does not present a serious problem for the
estimation of average program effects.
Moreover, the delay in the survey work
had the advantage of giving the program
more time to take effect, thereby providing
a more realistic evaluation of program oper-
ations, rather than an evaluation of program
delays. In October 2001, then, beneficiaries
had been receiving transfers and the educa-
tional components of the program had been
monitored for 13 months, but had only re-
ceived 5 months of the health-care services,
including the health education workshops.
The unforeseen delay in operations illus-
trates the importance of having a credible
control group—without the control it would
have been risky to alter the timing of the
survey and still confidently attribute observed
changes to RPS. The 2002 survey was also
carried out in October and in the second
year beneficiaries received all components
of the program for a full 12 months.
We now document non-response in the
2000 baseline survey and attrition and con-
tamination in the follow-up surveys. Overall,
90 percent (1,581) of the stratified random
sample was interviewed in the first round
(see Table 3.2) with slightly lower comple-
tion in control comarcas. The principal rea-
sons for failure to interview targeted sample
households were that household members
were temporarily absent (i.e., more than the
several days the survey team would be in
the area) or that the dwelling appeared to be
uninhabited—both of which are likely to
be associated with temporary or permanent
migration. In a handful of comarcas  the
coverage was 100 percent, but in six it was
under 80 percent. For the follow-up surveys
in October 2001, the target sample was lim-
ited to these 1,581 first-round interviews and
1,453 (91.9 percent) were re-interviewed.24
Among those classified as not being re-
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23IFPRI (2001a) describes the sample size calculations in more detail and IFPRI (2001b, 2003) describe the base-
line and follow-up samples in more detail. Since anthropometric measures were not part of the original indicator
list to be evaluated, they were not used in sample size calculations.
24Where possible, households who had moved within the six program municipalities were traced to their new
locations.interviewed are six households whose sur-
veys were lost and 37 households living in
control comarcas who in fact appear to have
been program beneficiaries, despite being
initially categorized as living in a control
comarca.As described earlier, the comarcas
used by RPS are census areas that often do
not coincide with communities. These 37
households (spread across a dozen comar-
cas) possibly were included in the program
as a result of reclassification of where they
lived by RPS (they did not move), relative
to the census boundary lines. Rather than
retain them in the control group, thereby
contaminating the results, they are dropped
from the 2001 and 2002 samples. Not sur-
prisingly, given that they represent only 5
percent of households in the control group,
their inclusion or exclusion affects estimated
results little. In 2002, just over 88 percent of
target households (including the 37 contam-
inated) were re-interviewed, on a par with
surveys of similar magnitude in other de-
veloping countries (Alderman et al. 2001;
Thomas, Frankenberg, and Smith 2001).
Because the same target sample was
used in 2002 as in 2001 (with the exception
of the lost surveys and contaminated house-
holds) regardless of whether the household
was interviewed in 2001, some households
that were not interviewed in 2001 were
successfully interviewed in 2002. There-
fore, the sample for which there is a com-
plete set of observations (in each of the
three survey rounds) is 1,359, smaller than
the 1,397 shown in the first row of the third
column of Table 3.2. These 1,359 form the
balanced panel sample used in the estima-
tions throughout this report. After excluding
the 37 contaminated households, the percent-
ages interviewed in intervention and control
groups were similar, indicating that at least
the level of attrition was not significantly
different between them.
Since the advantages of randomization
are dissipated with attrition if it is non-
random, we next examine the correlates of
the observed attrition to assess the likely
possible effects or biases on the ensuing
analyses (Thomas et al. 2003). Because of
the RPS census, which collected a variety
of information relevant to the program for
use in a proxy means prediction model and
allows us to predict expenditures for each
household, there is information on those
households not interviewed in the baseline.
Probit regressions (not shown) on all
original target sample households and pre-
dicting the probability of having been inter-
viewed in at least the first round or, sepa-
rately, having been interviewed in all three
rounds, indicate that attrition is indeed
non-random. Households that were not
interviewed were more likely to have an
older, more educated household head, larger
family size, higher predicted expenditures,
and more land. When the 37 contaminated
households are included in the sample,
households in the intervention group were
more likely to be re-interviewed but when
those households are excluded the indicator
for the treatment group is no longer signifi-
cant. A comparison of the means of these
same characteristics for those re-interviewed
compared with those not reinterviewed
shows significant differences for a subset of
them, but all of these differences are less
than one quarter of a standard deviation of
the variable in question, indicating they are
not on average large differences.
Sample households are on average
slightly better off than households lost to
follow-up. Given the findings presented later
in this report that estimated effects tend to
be larger for poorer households, basing esti-
mates on the balanced panel sample, as we
do, is likely to underestimate the actual ef-
fects of the program.25 Consistent with this,
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25Similarly, households not captured in the first census and therefore not part of the sample frame nor in the RPS
evaluation survey, were also slightly poorer on average (IFPRI 2001b), suggesting again the results presented in
this report are conservative.when the sample is expanded to those who
were not interviewed in all three rounds,
most estimated effects increase in magni-
tude (and in precision, owing to larger
sample sizes). A partial remedy to control
for attrition bias is to estimate a household
fixed-effects model, particularly if unob-
served persistent heterogeneity is leading to
attrition. When we estimate the models with
these controls, the estimated effects again
tend to increase slightly and are more pre-
cisely estimated. Taken together, we con-
clude that attrition is not a major concern for
estimating program effects and emphasize
that using only the balanced panel is likely
to slightly underestimate effects, making it a
conservative approach.
Validity of the Experiment
and the Evaluation
Outcome of the Randomization
Although the selection of comarcas into
intervention and control groups was un-
deniably random, it was at the same time
only one of the millions of possible random
draws. As a result, intervention and control
groups may still differ in significant or,
more importantly, substantive ways as the
result of a “bad” draw. In this section, we
provide evidence that the two groups are
indeed similar, examining differences be-
tween the groups for a set of indicators
(Behrman and Todd 1999). Even where
between-group differences exist, however,
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Table 3.2 Survey non-response and subsequent attrition
Baseline 2000 Follow-up 2001 Follow-up 2002
Completed interview 1,581 1,453 1,397
(89.6) (91.9) (88.4)
. . . of which
Intervention 810 766 722
(percent intervention) (91.8) (94.6) (89.1)
Control 771 687 675
(percent control) (87.4) (89.1) (87.6)
Completed interview in  1,359 1,359 1,359
all three rounds (77.0) (86.0) (86.0)
. . . of which
Intervention 706 706 706
(percent intervention) (80.0) (87.2) (87.2)
Control 653 653 653
(percent control) (74.0) (89.5) (89.5)
Not interviewed
Uninhabited dwelling 60 51 83
Temporary absence 100 28 46
Refusal 17 6 12
Urban (misclassified) 6 0 0
Contaminated 0 37 37
Lost questionnaire 0 6 6
Target sample 1,764 1,581 1,581
Source: Nicaraguan RPS evaluation data.
Notes: Percentage of target sample in parentheses.the evaluation can still measure impact be-
cause one can control for them in the analy-
sis, using the double-difference method.
Therefore, perfect “equality” between the
two groups is not a necessary condition for
the evaluation. Similarity does, however,
put the analysis on a sounder footing, par-
ticularly if there is the possibility that there
might be heterogeneous program effects
associated with differences between the
groups.
Table 3.3 first compares households in
control and intervention areas on a set of
demographic, education, wealth, and em-
ployment indicators. Of 15 indicators in the
top panel, only two related to household de-
mographics are significantly different at the
10 percent level of significance: (1) house-
hold size and (2) the number of children
younger than 5 years old. These are unlikely
to be problematic, however, because while
they are significantly different, they do not
appear to be substantively different. The dif-
ference in household size is less than 0.2
persons, 0.1 of which appear to be children
younger than age 5.
In the bottom portion of the table, the
proportion of households classified as ex-
tremely poor, poor, and non-poor are
listed.26 Because of the stratification into
groups of six comarcas each according to
the marginality index for randomization, the
expectation is that the different poverty
groups should be about equally represented
in intervention and control areas. The ex-
treme poverty rate in control areas is nearly
8 percentage points higher than in interven-
tion areas, and significantly different. Dif-
ferences between poverty rates are half that,
but also significant at the 10 percent level.
These differences are consistent with the
difference in household size and may in part
reflect that the per capita expenditure
measures used here to calculate poverty do
not adjust for demographic structure other
than number of persons; that is, they are not
per capita adult equivalents, for example
(Deaton and Zaidi 2002). As noted earlier,
however, the magnitude of these differences
does not appear to be such that they should
greatly affect interpretation of the results.
Further, comparisons of the same set of 15
indicators across intervention and control
areas within each poverty group (extremely
poor, poor but not extremely poor, and non-
poor) reveal only 5 significant differences in
45 comparisons.
The tables that show double-difference
estimates of the effects of the program
presented later in this report all show differ-
ences at baseline for the entire range of
outcomes analyzed. In no instance were any
of those measures significantly different at
baseline. From this analysis, we conclude
that the random assignment by comarca was
effective in delivering largely similar groups
on the whole, as well as similar groups of
extremely poor, poor but not extremely poor,
and non-poor.
Contamination of the Control
Group: Expectation Effects
As described in the first section of this chap-
ter, households in the control group were
likely to have learned about the program
and about the likelihood of their becoming
beneficiaries in the future. Even if house-
holds knew of the plan to expand to control
comarcas (in 2001), however, uncertainties
around the funding and expansion of this
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26These and other descriptions of poverty in the sample are calculated based on 2001 per capita annual expendi-
ture poverty lines of C$2,691 (US$202) for extremely poor (calculated as the amount required to purchase a min-
imum requirement food basket) and C$5,157 (US$386) for poor, which adds nonfood requirements (World Bank
2003). Households are classified into poverty groups based on their initially measured (in 2000) per capita annual
total household expenditures (including own-production) using these 2001 Nicaraguan poverty lines. Consumer
price inflation was about 4 percent per year during this period so that adjusting the poverty line for inflation
makes no difference in the substantive findings reported here.22 CHAPTER 3
Table 3.3 Comparison of intervention and control comarcas at baseline 2000
Difference 
Intervention Control (intervention Total
Indicator (n = 706) (n = 653) – control) (n = 1359)
Household size 5.93 6.12 –0.19* 6.02
(2.95) (2.78) [0.10] (2.87)
Number of children <5 years old 1.09 1.19 –0.10** 1.13
(1.10) (1.06) [0.04] (1.08)
Number of children <3 years old 0.71 0.77 –0.06 0.74
(0.85) (0.82) [0.13] (0.84)
Percentage of female-headed households 13.2 15.3 –2.1 14.2
[0.26]
Age of household head 44.6 43.9 0.7 44.3
(16.1) (15.3) [0.57] (15.7)
Years of education of household head 1.69 1.60 0.09 1.65
(2.17) (2.22) [0.41] (2.20)
Average years of education of adults 2.21 2.23 –0.02 2.22
(1.87) (1.85) [0.58] (1.86)
Percentage of children between 7 and 13 years  68.1 68.5 –0.04 68.2
of age who matriculated [0.66]
Time it takes to walk to school (minutes) 26.6 21.8 4.8 24.3
(34.1) (24.2) [0.13] (29.8)
Number of rooms in the home 1.50 1.53 –0.03 1.51
(0.78) (0.84) [0.69] (0.81)
Number of durable goodsa 0.23 0.23 0.00 0.23
(0.47) (0.47) [0.86] (0.47)
Size of land owned (hectares) 1.41 1.49 –0.08 1.45
(1.47) (1.88) [0.69] (1.68)
Percentage working as agricultural producer 83.1 82.8 0.3 83.0
[0.88]
Percentage working in coffee 9.9 8.6 1.3 9.3
[0.40]
Percentage using credit 15.3 16.4 –1.1 15.8
[0.58]
Expenditure class in baseline
Extremely poor 33.9 41.3 –7.5*** 37.5
[<0.01]
Poor 75.6 79.5 –3.9* 77.5
[0.09] 22.5
Non-poor 24.4 20.5 –3.9*
[0.09]
Source: Nicaraguan RPS evaluation data.
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses and p-values in brackets for test of equality of populations across
groups using two-tailed proportion test for proportions and non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test for all
others (StataCorp 2001). Analysis based on 706 observations in the intervention group and 653 obser-
vations in the control group in each year. Bold indicates significance at *** the 1 percent level, ** the
5 percent level, and * the 10 percent level. 
aIncludes radio/tape recorder, stove, air conditioner, and fan.government-run program would certainly
have led them to assign a probability of less
than one to that eventuality. The uncertainty
is underscored by the fact that the original
plan was in fact not fulfilled, and control
households did not enter the program until
more than a year after originally envisioned.
Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the pos-
sibility that households had expectations
about receiving the program, and that they
changed their behavior based on those
expectations.
Rational households aware of the pro-
gram likely would have endeavored to learn
about it, in an effort to better position them-
selves as potential beneficiaries. One indi-
cator of program knowledge (available in
2002) is how well households answered six
true-or-false questions about program re-
quirements.27 On average, about half of the
households in the control group answered
that they did not know. Of those who indi-
cated they knew, approximately three quar-
ters answered each question correctly. Al-
though specific knowledge of the program
was not the norm among non-beneficiaries,
it appears that approximately one-third were
aware of specific program features.
Thus, contamination of the control group
due to expectations is a real possibility, al-
though it may be limited to only a fraction
of the households. The possible effects of
such contamination are themselves ambigu-
ous, however. Perhaps the largest influence
of this type of contamination would be
seen in school enrollment. If there was an
expectation that households would partici-
pate in RPS (with its eligibility requirements
around schooling) 1 or 2 years down the
road, their incentives for current schooling
decisions would change. There may be an
inter-temporal substitution effect, in which
households decrease school enrollment in
the current period while it is unsubsidized,
or there may be complementarities between
current and future schooling (if it is costly to
go back to school), raising current enroll-
ment. There also may be incentives to hold
children back so that they do not reach fifth
grade before the program begins, although
this is less clear in cases where there were
younger siblings who would be eligible.
Clearly, the sum of these possible effects on
schooling decisions is ambiguous. It is even
less clear whether and how other behaviors,
for example, around care of children younger
than age 5, might change in anticipation of
the program. Unfortunately, we can bring
little additional evidence to bear on these
concerns.
We therefore emphasize the possibility
that such contamination may confound some
of the double-difference estimates. For ex-
ample, in the case of school enrollments,
double-difference estimates may tend to un-
derstate the effects of the program if control
group expectations led to an increase in en-
rollment in control areas. Further, it may
confound comparisons across subgroups to
the extent such contamination was not uni-
form, for example, if it affected children of
different ages differently. Therefore, when
interpreting results such as those around ed-
ucational decisions, we consider results that
include as well as results that exclude older
children who plausibly would have been af-
fected differentially by the possible changes
in behavior. Finally, in addition to double-
difference estimates, the tables present
single-difference estimates including reflex-
ive differences within intervention comar-
cas over time, to permit an assessment of the
extent to which such contamination might
be affecting the double-difference estimates.
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27Questions included statements such as: “To be a beneficiary of RPS, the household must take one-year old chil-
dren to checkups every two months.” This statement is false, as the requirement for children younger than 2 years
old is monthly. Adato and Roopnaraine (2004) indicate that beneficiaries knew these requirements very well.Contamination of the Control
Group: Other Programs
A second possible source of contamination
is attributable to other programs, referred to
as substitution bias by Heckman and Smith
(1995). This occurs when households in
control  comarcas  participate in programs
similar or complementary to RPS. The delay
by 1 year before the control group was in-
cluded may have increased the probability
of such contamination, as it gave NGOs and
others more time to adjust to the presence of
RPS in intervention comarcas, possibly by
pulling their programs out of intervention
areas and increasing their efforts in control
areas. While the RPS evaluation was sanc-
tioned by the Government of Nicaragua and,
therefore, plans were coordinated such that
other large government programs (such as
the Programa de Atención Integral a La
Niñez Nicaragüense [PAININ]) avoided
entering these areas over this period, other
actors less tied to the government were not
prohibited from doing so. To the extent other
programs are not simply reacting to the
evaluation itself, this design offers a more
reasonable counterfactual compared to one
in which no other program was allowed to
enter the area.
Potential contamination by other devel-
opment programs providing services to
households was monitored in the annual
household surveys. These data allow us to
calculate the percentage of households in
each comarca that were benefiting from
an array of possible programs and services,
and to determine whether or not RPS was
the provider. Services provided by RPS fall
into three of the dozen categories listed,
shown in the top panel of Table 3.4: (1) pro-
vision of school supplies (via the education
supplies transfer), (2) promotion and moni-
toring of child growth and development, and
(3) food support to families. Table 3.4 shows
that the percentages of households receiving
these services from RPS increased dramati-
cally between 2000 and 2001 and, with the
exception of food support to families, con-
tinued to rise in 2002.28 Receipt of these
services by intervention-area households
from non-RPS providers fell from 2000 to
2002, suggesting that other providers were
crowded out by RPS. This decline was par-
ticularly sharp for the provision of school
supplies but less so for the two other services,
which started at much lower levels. This
crowding out effect seems also to have ex-
tended to control areas, as the percentage of
households receiving school supplies there
declined from 35 percent in 2000 to 11 per-
cent in 2001, rebounding in part to 20 percent
in 2002. We are unable to determine whether
these similarly sized parallel changes in the
percentage benefiting from non-RPS pro-
vided school supplies in intervention and
control areas were due to crowding out or
simply a regional contraction of this pro-
gram by the Ministry of Education.
In addition to the services provided by
RPS, we also examine the percentages of
beneficiaries for nine other kinds of pro-
grams that, while not actual components of
RPS, may influence some of the same out-
comes considered in the evaluation of RPS,
such as household expenditures, primary
school enrollment, or health-care and nutri-
tional status of children. Except for school
feeding, all of these other programs were
operating at low levels in these marginal,
rural areas, and were approximately equally
distributed across intervention and control
comarcas. Furthermore, the comarca level
data show that, if anything, the density of
these other programs is generally lower in
control comarcas.
A notable trend in both intervention and
control areas was the substantial increase in
the percentage of households whose chil-
dren benefited from school feeding. In 2000,
11–13 percent of households benefited from
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28We are unable to explain why there was such a sharp drop in the “food supply” category in 2002 and suspect
there was a problem of interpretation in training or in the field for that question in that survey round.school feeding, provided mainly by the
Ministry of Education. By 2002, however,
this had increased nearly fivefold, to 50 per-
cent, in both intervention and control areas.
The comarca level data show that school
feeding programs were active in all control
and all but two intervention comarcas by
2002, as the World Food Programme ex-
panded its presence in these areas. Because
the increase was identical across interven-
tion and control comarcas, however, this
trend can be controlled for in part using the
double-difference methodology.29 If RPS led
to crowding out of school supplies services
in control areas as well as intervention
areas, it is possible the estimated double-
difference effects are upward biased (rela-
tive to a situation in which RPS did not lead
to a decline in control group services), al-
though such bias is unlikely to be severe be-
cause the changes are similar in the two
groups. In addition, school feeding, the only
type of service other than those provided by
RPS that changed substantially, increased
equally in both intervention and control co-
marcas. We conclude that there is little evi-
dence of substitution bias in the control
group and therefore it is unlikely to be an
important source of contamination biasing
the estimation.
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29We are unaware of any estimates for the effects of school feeding in Nicaragua (or Central America); such es-
timates would provide an opportunity to adjust the double-difference estimates, at least crudely.
Table 3.4 Percentage of households benefiting from development programs and services
2000 2001 2002
Control Intervention Control Intervention Control Intervention
Non- Non- Non- Non- Including Non- Non- Including
RPS RPS RPS RPS RPS RPS RPS RPS
Provision of school supplies 34.6 27.6 10.7 6.4 45.3 20.2 10.8 57.4
Promotion and monitoring of child 3.1 6.1 2.9 2.4 42.4 4.3 1.4 53.8
growth and development
Food support to families 4.4 3.1 5.4 3.5 90.1 3.5 2.8 11.8
School feeding 11.0 12.7 39.4 42.6 — 50.2 50.1 —
Adult literacy and education 4.0 2.5 3.4 1.8 — 2.1 1.1 —
Health and environmental training 4.3 6.9 4.1 9.9 — 3.4 2.3 —
Health outreach/preventive health  4.0 5.1 3.4 8.8 — 2.5 2.4 —
training
Provision of money without obligation 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.0 — 0.6 0.7 —
to repay
Provision of credit 4.0 6.2 6.7 2.7 — 6.6 2.3 —
Technical assistance and training 3.7 4.4 3.7 5.1 — 2.8 2.3 —
Provision of seeds or fertilizer for  10.1 8.5 4.0 3.4 — 7.7 4.0 —
agricultural use
Community development training 2.8 3.0 1.2 1.6 — 0.6 1.1 —
Source: Nicaraguan RPS evaluation data.
Notes: Analysis based on 706 observations in the intervention group and 653 observations in the control group in each year. CHAPTER 4
The Effects of Conditional Cash Transfers:
The Red de Protección Social
T
he IADB loan document contained a set of specific indicators and numerical goals for
the first year of operations as a condition for approval of the second tranche of the loan
financing RPS (see Appendix C), and these were used in the sample size calculations
described in the first section of Chapter 3. Although the program achieved most of these goals
and the loan extension was approved in 2003, we do not emphasize these specific indicators
in our analysis because (1) they represent only a subset of the possible effects of the program,
(2) they are somewhat arbitrary because there was little information on which to base numer-
ical goals during the design stage, and (3) they largely measure process or inputs and did not
capture the underlying objectives of the program such as improved human capital. While the
trend by development institutions to embed project evaluations in projects from the start is
positive, we would caution against overspecifying the goals or holding to them too rigidly, par-
ticularly when little evidence of similar programs exists.30 Hence, although we present results
for the contractually agreed-to indicators, we do not compare the results with the numerical
goals. Moreover, we present results on a large number of additional indicators including direct
measures of one form of human capital, the nutritional status of children younger than age 5.
Household Expenditures
Despite strong growth in the late 1990s and in 2000 when gross domestic product grew nearly
13 percent, Nicaragua had the lowest per capita GDP in Central America in 2000. Subsequent
slow growth, however, meant that income per capita was essentially stagnant over the
2000–02 period (World Bank 2004). At the outset, 36–61 percent of the rural population in
each of the RPS municipalities was extremely poor and 78–90 percent was extremely poor or
poor, compared with national averages in 1998 of 21 and 45 percent, respectively. Within the
42 comarcas selected for the program evaluation, 42 percent of the population was extremely
poor before the program—that is to say, their total expenditures were less than the amount
necessary to purchase a food basket providing minimum caloric requirements (World Bank
2003)—and 80 percent extremely poor or poor. Moreover, the majority of the remaining
households, or “non-poor” in the sample, was in the bottom two-thirds of the national
Nicaraguan per capita expenditure distribution and so was near-poor. Clearly there was sub-
stantial need, and hence scope for alleviating current poverty, in this population.
30During Phase I, RPS and IADB renegotiated the indicators, indicating they were not rigidly applied in this case.
26Table 4.1 shows the average effect of
RPS on nominal annual total household ex-
penditures.31 The control column shows that
in 2000, before the program began, average
annual total household expenditures in the
control areas were C$20,483 (US$1,594).
A year later, expenditures had declined by
C$2,673 (US$208) to C$17,810 (US$1,386)
although by 2002 they had recovered
slightly, reaching C$18,268 (US$1,422).
The intervention column shows preprogram
annual total household expenditures of
C$20,725 (US$1,613) in the beneficiary
areas. After 1 year of operation, annual total
household expenditures had risen by nearly
C$1,500 (US$117) to C$22,194 (US$1,727),
but then fell back to C$21,327 (US$1,660)
in 2002, only C$602 (US$47 or about 3 per-
cent) above the level reported in the 2000
baseline.
As shown in the right-hand “Difference”
column, before the program began, annual
total household expenditures in 2000 were
very similar in the intervention and control
areas (differing by only C$242 or US$19).
One year later, however, that small initial
difference had grown to C$4,384 (US$341),
and the net average increase, or double-
difference estimate of the effect of the pro-
gram between 2000 and 2001, was C$4,142
(US$322). The estimated effect of the
program declined to C$2,817 (US$219) in
2002,32 however, with a decline in interven-
tion areas of nearly C$1,000 (US$78) and
the slight recovery in control areas.
For comparison, the average value of
annual cash transfers for intervention co-
marca households in the evaluation survey
over the period was C$3,500 or US$272 (as
only five of the scheduled six transfers were
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31The construction of the expenditure measures is detailed in IFPRI (2001b). We present nominal rather than real
inflation-adjusted figures to enable a more direct comparison with the fixed nominal transfer levels.
32When we examine the double-difference estimate on the natural logarithm of annual total household expendi-
tures (so that they more closely approximate a normal distribution) it is significant at the 1 percent level. In the
text, absolute measures are presented to facilitate interpretation and comparison with the nominal transfer
amounts.
Table 4.1 RPS average effect on annual total household expenditures
Survey round Intervention Control Difference
Follow-up 2002 21,327 18,268 3,059*
[706] [653] (1,633)
Follow-up 2001 22,194 17,810 4,384***
[706] [653] (1,323)
Baseline 2000 20,725 20,483 242
[706] [653] (1,288)
Difference 2001–2000 1,469** –2,673*** 4,142***
(706) (955) (1,174)
Difference 2002–2000 602 –2,215** 2,817**
(798) (956) (1,230)
Source: Nicaraguan RPS evaluation data.
Notes: Standard errors correcting for heteroskedasticity and allowing for clustering at the
comarca level are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001). Analysis based on 706
observations in the intervention group and 653 observations in the control group
in each year (shown in brackets). Bold indicates significance at *** the 1 percent
level, ** the 5 percent level, and * the 10 percent level.made in each year). Thus the average esti-
mated impact on expenditures was above
average transfers in the first year, but below
them in the second year. In both cases,
however, it was of the same order of mag-
nitude and in neither year can we reject the
hypothesis that the estimated effect is sig-
nificantly different from the average annual
transfer amount of C$3,500. The C$700
(US$54) difference between estimated ef-
fects and transfer amounts may in part reflect
imprecision in measuring annual household
expenditures (IFPRI 2001b).
Nevertheless, we can conclude that ben-
eficiary households are, on average, spend-
ing a large proportion of their transfers on
current expenditures, although the fraction
spent appears to have been smaller in the
second year, perhaps in part because they
were less critically needed as the area under-
went a partial recovery compared to 2001.
Comparing across the extremely poor, poor
(but not extremely poor), and non-poor in
the sample, we find that the largest esti-
mated double-difference effect was for the
extremely poor households (over C$3,800
or US$296 in 2002).
The drop in expenditures in the control
group seems to have been due in part to an
economic downturn in the areas where RPS
was operating and in Nicaragua more gen-
erally. Within the control group, expendi-
tures fell among the poor and non-poor but
held steady for the extremely poor.33 Two
events affecting the area included a severe
drought in 2001 and a sharp, persistent drop
in international coffee prices, which affected
many of the agricultural laborers in that in-
dustry (Varangis et al. 2003). The rural Cen-
tral Region of Nicaragua was the most
affected by these events and was the only
region showing an increase in poverty rates
between 1998 and 2001 (World Bank
2003). The transfers provided by RPS ap-
parently compensated for income losses
during this downturn. Although not designed
as a traditional safety net program in the
sense of reacting or adjusting to crises or
shocks, the economic difficulties experi-
enced in these communities allowed RPS
to perform like a traditional safety net, en-
abling households to maintain expenditures
during the downturn.
The substantial decline in expenditures
in the control areas demonstrates the im-
portance of having a baseline and a control
group in this, or any, evaluation. Control
groups help isolate the effects attributable
to the program and keep them from being
confounded with other, nonprogram factors.
Without a control group, the analysis would
have mistakenly concluded that the RPS
had no effect on annual total household ex-
penditures in 2002 (see the insignificant
C$602 or US$47 difference over time in the
intervention group in the second to bottom
row of the first column of Table 4.1).
The RPS effects on per capita annual
total household expenditures are shown in
Table 4.2. Average per capita expenditures
in 2000 were just over US$300 for the
sample, compared to a national average of
nearly US$500 in 2000, again indicative
of the relative deprivation of the program
areas. The patterns seen for total expendi-
tures, combined with little change in house-
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33The drop in expenditures in the control group was not due to changes in household size or family composition,
as we show in Table 4.2, which reports per capita expenditures. Another possibility is that there are biases in the
reporting of expenditures. For example, in control areas it is possible that nonbeneficiaries who had learned about
the program understated their expenditures in an effort to appear more in need of the program. However, at this
stage, the program was being implemented using predominantly geographical targeting and being more or less
poor would not have affected their eligibility. At the same time, beneficiaries may be overstating food expendi-
tures knowing that increased expenditures on food was one of the objectives of RPS. The fact that the net change
in average expenditures in 2002 is similar in magnitude to the amount of cash transfers suggests these sorts of re-
porting biases are not substantially altering the findings. There would be more concern if, for example, changes
in expenditures were significantly and substantially larger than the transfer.hold size, yield a significant increase in per
capita annual total household expenditures
within the intervention group, as well as
significant declines for the control group.
Taken together, these changes produce aver-
age program effects of C$986 (US$77) in
2001 and C$686 (US$53) in 2002. In 2002,
the average effect of the RPS was nearly 18
percent of initial per capita annual house-
hold expenditures. This average, however,
masks substantial differences among the
extremely poor, poor, and non-poor in the
sample. For the extremely poor, the esti-
mated average effect is C$819 (US$64) for
2002 and represents 30 percent of initial per
capita expenditures.
Since the changes in expenditures for
poorer households were relatively large, RPS
had a substantial effect on the percentage of
extremely poor households in the program
areas. The average effect on the extreme
poverty rate in 2001 was –22 percentage
points and in 2002, –16 percentage points.
Declines in the overall poverty rate were
smaller, –10 and –5 percentage points,
respectively. Unsurprisingly, the income
supplementation has a significant effect on
expenditure-based measures of current
poverty. In Figure 4.1, we show this in an
alternative fashion by graphing the empiri-
cal density functions of the logarithm of per
capita annual total household expenditures
in the year 2002 for households in the con-
trol and intervention groups, separately. The
program has shifted the density function
to the right (and decreased its spread) and
the percentages of households that are ex-
tremely poor (to the left of the extreme
poverty line) or poor (to the left of the pov-
erty line) are substantially lower in the
intervention comarcas. Nevertheless, even
in the intervention comarcas, large propor-
tions of households remain extremely poor
(32 percent) or poor or extremely poor (77
percent).
Showing a pattern similar to per capita
annual total household expenditures, RPS
produced significant net average increases
in per capita annual food expenditures of
C$871 (US$68) in 2001 and C$640 (US$50)
in 2002 (Table 4.3), and these averages again
mask larger effects for the extremely poor
and poor. The average increases in the per
capita annual food expenditures are approx-
imately equal to the average changes in per
capita annual total household expenditures
in each year. Consistent with the program’s
goals, additional expenditures as a result of
the transfers were spent predominantly on
food. During the incorporation assemblies
and some of the health education workshops,
an informal “requirement” that the income
supplements are primarily intended for food
purchases is emphasized. In addition, Adato
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Table 4.2 RPS average effect on per capita annual total 
household expenditures
Survey round Intervention Control Difference
Follow-up 2002 4,346 3,378 968**
(385)
Follow-up 2001 4,462 3,194 1,268***
(285)
Baseline 2000 4,021 3,738 283
(290)
Difference 2001–2000 441*** –544*** 986***
(146) (172) (223)
Difference 2002–2000 325** –360** 686***
(153) (168) (224)
See notes for Table 4.1.and Roopnaraine (2004) present evidence
that some promotoras take this aspect of the
program very seriously, asking to see receipts
after transfers have been made (though it is
not possible to gauge how widespread this
practice is). Whatever the mechanism, RPS
was very important in preventing the deteri-
oration of the food security situation in the
intervention group, offsetting the decline seen
in the control group. Although we do not di-
rectly test this hypothesis, these results point
to a likely increase in calories consumed (at
the household level), as seen in PROGRESA
(Hoddinott and Skoufias 2005).
Table 4.4 shows how the significant
changes in per capita food expenditures
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Table 4.3 RPS average effect on per capita annual food expenditures
Survey round Intervention Control Difference
Follow-up 2002 3,029 2,207 822***
(258)
Follow-up 2001 3,175 2,122 1,053***
(217)
Baseline 2000 2,760 2,578 182
(180)
Difference 2001–2000 415*** –456*** 871***
(140) (132) (190)
Difference 2002–2000 269** –371** 640***
(119) (140) (182)
See notes for Table 4.1.affected the share of food expenditures in
the household budget. RPS produced a sig-
nificant net increase of 4.5 percentage
points in the food share in 2002 and this
change was roughly the same across pov-
erty groups. The percentage of the budget
spent on food changed little for households
in the intervention group after implementa-
tion, remaining at approximately 70 percent,
a level consistent with the relatively high
poverty rates for this group when compared
to the 1998 national average of 60 percent.
Although this net average effect on the
food share is consistent with the program’s
success in promoting increased food expen-
ditures, it comes not from an increase in the
food share for beneficiaries but from a de-
cline in the food share of the control group.
What is somewhat surprising is that the
food share was declining for control house-
holds during an economic downturn marked
by decreased expenditures. For a relatively
poor population such as this, one would
expect the food share to increase as total ex-
penditures declined, since in this and other
populations, households with greater per
capita expenditures typically have lower
food shares. It turns out that much of the de-
cline in the food share for the control group
can be attributed to implementing the 2001
and 2002 surveys in October rather than in
August and September, when the baseline
2000 survey was carried out. In a quality
control survey carried out in October 2000
(before the economic downturn) on a ran-
domly selected subset of baseline house-
holds, food shares were substantially lower
than they were in baseline interviews (IFPRI
2001b). Seasonality seems to play an im-
portant role in the food shares we observe,
although, as emphasized earlier, it is not
biasing the estimated average effects of the
program, which show a net increase in the
food share for beneficiary households rela-
tive to non-beneficiary households.
In addition to enabling more spending
on food, one of the objectives of RPS is to
improve the food security and nutrition of
beneficiary households. We explore how
well this was achieved by decomposing the
increase in food expenditures into its com-
ponent parts. The RPS baseline and RPS
follow-up surveys list 60 types of food pur-
chased or obtained by home production in
the households (IFPRI 2001a). It appears
that the transfers have had a significant ef-
fect on dietary diversity, a correlate of food
security (Hoddinott and Yohannes 2002). A
double-difference estimate of the number of
different types of purchases reported shows
that the program appears to be promoting
a more diverse diet. At the outset in 2000,
households reported consuming an average
of 12.1 (SD 5.5) different items excluding
alcohol and tobacco. On average, house-
holds in the intervention areas report that
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Table 4.4 RPS average effect on food shares (percentage)
Survey round Intervention Control Difference
Follow-up 2002 70.0 66.4 3.6***
(0.9)
Follow-up 2001 70.6 66.8 3.8***
(1.2)
Baseline 2000 70.0 70.8 –0.8
(1.5)
Difference 2001–2000 0.6 –4.0*** 4.7***
(1.2) (1.3) (1.7)
Difference 2002–2000 0.0 –4.4*** 4.5***
(1.0) (0.9) (1.3)
See notes for Table 4.1.they were buying nearly four (of the 60) ad-
ditional food types in 2002, a result that was
similar across the poverty groups (results
not shown).
Not only did the number of food items
purchased increase, but their nutritional
value did as well. By organizing the types of
food into different categories, two conclu-
sions can be reached (see Table 4.5). First,
in absolute terms, expenditure on nearly all
food groups increased with the program (and
nowhere did it significantly decrease).34 Sec-
ond, nutrient-dense foods (including meats
and fruits and vegetables) emphasized in the
health education sessions and associated with
a better quality diet increased not only in
terms of absolute expenditures but also as a
percentage of total food expenditures. These
relative improvements were accompanied
by an increase in fats and oils as well, and
were made possible by declines in two
staples (grains and beans) that represented
more than 50 percent of the preintervention
budgets of beneficiary households. More-
over, extremely poor households show the
largest changes in the nutritional quality of
the food purchased, indicating those most
in need were benefiting the most. Exploring
whether this improved diet was associated
with nutritional improvements for children
within these households is the subject of the
fourth section in this chapter.
The majority of the additional expendi-
tures induced by RPS were spent on food.
A second key component of the program,
however, is education. In 2002, the esti-
mated average effect of RPS on educational
expenditures was C$322 (US$25), slightly
larger than the per student value of the edu-
cational supplies transfer (C$275 or US$21).
These gains were concentrated in the ex-
tremely poor and poor households as well
as in households with children ages 7–13
(where the estimated program effect was
C$428 or US$33). Health-care expenditures
actually decreased with RPS (–C$46 or
–US$4), although this effect is significant
only when the extremely poor are considered
separately. This is consistent with the fact
that the program provides many health-care
services free of charge, which were possibly
substituting for others that beneficiaries pre-
viously had to pay for directly or via other
related costs, such as travel expenses.
The study also asked about other forms
of expenditures related to investments at the
household level, such as on household im-
provements, durable goods, and so forth;
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34Information about alcohol and tobacco expenditures in these types of surveys is often unreliable; it is presented
separately and we draw no conclusions from the reported information.
Table 4.5 RPS average effect on the composition of food expenditures
2000 2000–2002 Average 2000 2000–2002 Average
Average effect on Average effect on
Food category (C$) expenditures (C$) (%) food share (%)
Grains, potatoes, bread 7,049 649 48.7 –2.9
Beans 1,485 –137 11.3 –3.7***
Meat 1,185 761*** 7.3 2.2**
Milk 560 139 3.4 0.5
Fats 1,302 699*** 9.2 2.4***
Fruits and vegetables 784 554*** 5.3 2.5***
Alcohol and tobacco 99 19 0.5 0.1
Sweets 1,011 348*** 7.8 0.4
Other 824 –69 6.4 –1.7**
See notes for Table 4.1.none of these showed significant changes.
Finally, we examine expenditures on other
specific non-food items including books,
furniture, child clothing, remittances sent,
lotteries, and parties, and find no significant
program effects. Naturally, since total ex-
penditures were flat while the percentage
spent on food remained the same, it was un-
likely that investments or expenditures like
these would have changed very much. It is
important to emphasize that the evidence in-
dicates that households are indeed follow-
ing the recommendations of the program;
that is, they are spending most of their in-
come from the program on current (food
and education) expenditures.35 This finding
is somewhat weaker in the second year,
however, where increased expenditures ap-
pear to be slightly smaller than the transfers.
It is possible that any differences are re-
flected in increased savings (or increased
leisure, discussed later), although we do not
have the information to verify this. In either
case, these patterns should be considered as
RPS plans its exit strategy, and may have
implications for the sustainability of the
many effects described in this report.
Another obvious possible effect of the
program on the household economy is on
income generation, via labor participation
and labor supply. In terms of “expenditures,”
one can think of this as an increase in the
leisure consumed by household members.
In short, the transfers may provide a dis-
incentive for working. We explore this pos-
sibility examining first labor participation
and second, hours of labor supplied.
The survey asked about labor force par-
ticipation for primary and secondary ac-
tivities in the previous week, and provides
information about the number of hours
worked (apart from domestic activities). All
individuals older than 6 years of age were
asked whether work was their primary ac-
tivity in the previous week and, if not, why
it was that they did not work. Work included
working for pay or other remuneration out-
side the home, as well as unpaid labor in
household enterprises such as agriculture
or small business. If the primary activity
was not work, the individual was further
prompted about other activities in the previ-
ous week. To assess labor participation
and labor supply, we focus on adults in
the household (child labor is examined in the
second section of this chapter). Examining
separately women and men age 15 and
older, there were no significant changes in
labor participation in the previous week (re-
sults not shown). More than 90 percent of
men report having worked the week before,
and there are no differences between periods
or between intervention and control areas.
For women, about 25 percent reported
working in the previous week before the
program. This percentage declined by about
10 percentage points in 2001 and 2002, in
both intervention and control areas with the
result that, as with the men, there were no
program effects on the probability of their
working.
Although the program appears not to
have had an effect on labor participation, it
is still possible that labor supply, that is, the
number of hours worked, was affected,
particularly for women who had a number
of new responsibilities under the program.
To explore this, we estimate the effect of
the program on the total number of hours
worked in the last week by female and male
adults in the household, separately (Tables
4.6 and 4.7). There was a small decline (of
about 3 hours) in reported hours worked in
the last week by adult women living in inter-
vention comarcas, consistent with increased
responsibilities associated with the pro-
gram. Nevertheless, the double-difference
estimated effects, while negative, are small
and insignificant. For men, however, there
is evidence of a disincentive effect on hours
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35Information on savings is not available so it is not possible to assess whether there was increased savings. Given
the evidence on expenditures relative to the transfer size, however, any such increase was likely to be small.worked in the last week, of about 6 hours in
both years. While not significantly depress-
ing the labor supply of beneficiaries (which
actually increased from 2000 to 2002) rela-
tive to before the program, it significantly
reduced labor supply relative to their coun-
terparts without the program.36 The down-
turn in the economy appears to have led
to increased labor supply by control group
households. Crudely approximating the
value of lost income from this decrease in
hours worked at C$20 (US$1.50) per week
(taking C$30 or US$2.30 as the daily wage)
yields an amount approximately equal to the
gap between the estimated increase in ex-
penditures in 2002 and the average transfer.
Thus, it seems that households took some
of their benefits of the program in the form
of increased leisure, although this was in-
creased leisure relative to the control group
not relative to before the program.
Last, we assessed the effect of the pro-
gram on transfer or remittance behavior;
cash transfers may crowd out remittances
received by the household (Jensen 2003).
The survey indicates that remittances are
uncommon in this population, with fewer
than 5 percent of respondents reporting
having received remittances in the previous
12 months. For those who receive them,
however, they can be substantial, averaging
about C$4,000 (US$311) annually, approxi-
mately the same size as the average RPS
transfer. Nevertheless, we find no evidence
of crowding out as there are no significant
program effects on the probability that re-
mittances were received or average remit-
tances received (results not shown), although
this may be due, in part, to the characteristic
that reported remittances were relatively
uncommon in the sample.
Schooling and Child Labor
Education levels in Nicaragua are dismal.
One third of adults older than 25 years of
age have no formal education and another
third have never completed primary school.
Although increasing school coverage and
stable political conditions in the 1990s have
spurred improvements, at 78 percent the
net primary enrollment ratio remained one
of the lowest in Latin America in the late
1990s (World Bank 2001). Not surprisingly,
these low enrollment rates are accompanied
by a high incidence of child labor, particu-
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36Adato and Roopnaraine (2004) found that adult males reported being able to work more often closer to home
(e.g., on their own parcels), so it is possible that some of the decrease in labor hours supplied is due to decreased
commuting time.
Table 4.6 RPS average effect on hours worked last week: Women
Survey round Intervention Control Difference
Follow-up 2002 9.0 13.5 –4.5***
(2.0)
Follow-up 2001 8.1 12.8 4.7**
(1.9)
Baseline 2000 12.1 14.5 –2.4
(1.8)
Difference 2001–2000 –4.0*** –1.7 –2.2
(1.0) (1.4) (1.7)
Difference 2002–2000 –3.1*** –1.0 –2.1
(0.9) (1.5) (1.7)
See notes for Table 4.1.larly for boys. In 1998, 27 percent of boys
ages 10–14 in rural areas were working an
average of 30 hours a week (World Bank
2001). These poor outcomes, despite im-
provements in school supply, are primary
concerns for the economic development of
Nicaragua; at the same time, they suggest a
potentially large role for demand-side inter-
ventions such as RPS.
Before the start of RPS, the enrollment
rate in the program area for the target group,
those ages 7–13 who had not yet completed
fourth grade of primary school, was 72 per-
cent.37 This overall average demonstrated a
large potential for improved outcomes but
at the same time masked important differ-
ences by age of the child and level of
household economic well-being. Figure 4.2a
shows enrollment (or matriculation) rates
by age for the target sample in 2000. For
the targeted children, enrollment peaked at
just above 80 percent for 9- and 10-year-
olds but declined to 50 percent by age 13.
Thus, even at its peak, there is substantial
room for improvement. In addition, the
(initially rising) age pattern indicated that,
of those children who eventually attend
school, many start late; the legal starting
age for first grade is 7. Another likely effect
of the program would be to improve age-
appropriate starts.
Figure 4.2b shows the enrollment rates
for the same children by poverty group and
by sex. These simple comparisons suggest
that resources play a role in the decision to
enroll children. Indeed, children living in
households in the lowest per capita expen-
diture decile in the sample were more than
one-third less likely to have enrolled than
those living in the wealthiest decile (not
shown). There was little difference between
the enrollment rates for boys and girls. This
accords with results from the qualitative
study in which nearly all men and women
interviewed said that they believed that ed-
ucation was just as important for boys as for
girls (Adato and Roopnaraine 2004). Al-
though not controlling for the many other
factors that affect enrollment, this evidence
still suggests that there was potential for a
cash transfer program to influence enroll-
ment rates.
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37We use the survey data to assess enrollment and attendance, because administrative data are unavailable in con-
trol comarcas. In intervention comarcas, the data agree closely with separately collected administrative data from
RPS, indicating that households do not appear to be overstating attendance since they know it is a program con-
dition. Further, Adato and Roopnaraine (2004) found no evidence of falsification of school records sent to RPS,
so the administrative data to which we compare the survey data appear to be accurate.
Table 4.7 RPS average effect on hours worked last week: Men
Survey round Intervention Control Difference
Follow-up 2002 65.9 71.4 –5.5*
(3.1)
Follow-up 2001 63.1 69.2 –6.1**
(2.7)
Baseline 2000 62.6 62.5 0.1
(4.0)
Difference 2001–2000 0.5 6.7*** –6.2**
(1.8) (2.3) (2.9)
Difference 2002–2000 3.3* 8.9*** –5.5*
(1.6) (2.7) (3.1)
See notes for Table 4.1.Similar patterns emerge for current at-
tendance in school in 2000, collected ap-
proximately 3 months before the end of the
academic year and shown in Figure 4.3. A
child is defined to be currently attending if
he indicated he was still enrolled and had
either missed 3 or fewer days in the past
month or had missed more, but because of
illness. As with enrollment at the start of the
year, current attendance rises to ages 9–10
and declines thereafter. Dropout was com-
mon with the percentage of these children
still in school toward the end of the aca-
demic year 9 percentage points lower than
the percentage enrolled at the outset of the
year. Attendance is also related to resources;
again, it is evident that there was substantial
room for improvement.
RPS induced a significant average net
increase (2000–02) in school enrollment at
the start of the school year of 18.5 percent-
age points in 2001 and 12.8 percentage
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Figure 4.2b Enrollment in 2000 for 7- to 13-year-olds who had not completed fourth
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Percent enrolledpoints in 2002 (Table 4.8). Before the pro-
gram, enrollment rates in intervention and
control areas for this age group were very
similar with approximately 72 percent of
eligible children enrolling. With the program,
enrollment rose to 92.7 percent in 2002. En-
rollment in the control group also increased,
however, by 7.6 percentage points. Even
with that increase (which we discuss later),
however, the transfers proved to be a huge
additional stimulus. For comparison with a
similar, although not identical program,
double-difference estimates of changes in
enrollment attributable to PROGRESA were
less than 5 percentage points for primary
school students (largely because enrollment
in primary school in Mexico was already
high) and approximately 12 percentage
points for grades 6 through 8 (Schultz 2004).
To examine what underlies the average
effect of 12.8 percentage points on enroll-
ment, we consider the effect of the program
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Figure 4.3b Current attendance in 2000 for 7- to 13-year-olds who had not completed
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Percent attendingby age. The results are shown in Figure 4.4a,
in which the bottom, dotted portion of each
column shows the initial situation described
earlier (Figure 4.2a), and the top, unshaded,
portion is the double-difference estimated
average program effect. In all cases, this ef-
fect was positive (although it was not statis-
tically significant for ages 10–12). By 2002,
enrollment rates in the intervention areas had
risen to 90–100 percent for those ages 7–12,
and no longer varied as much by age.38
Figure 4.4a shows that gains were made
in enrollment by reaching both younger
children, who are now more likely to enroll
(no longer delaying entry into school) and,
at the same time, older children who had
completed some schooling and left but now
are returning, particularly 13-year-olds. A
potential concern for the latter group is that
they were returning to the first two grades.
If so, this would lead to more mixing of
younger and older children in the same
grade with classroom disruption a possible
consequence. Nearly all (80 percent) of the
overall improvement in enrollment came
from younger children, however, and most
of the older children who returned to school
were returning to the third and fourth
grades. Moreover, both the average and
standard deviation of child age by grade
remained constant before and after the
program, indicating little change in overall
classroom composition. Figure 4.4b pre-
sents results for enrollment by poverty group
and by sex. Clearly, the extremely poor and
poor are benefiting most—the relationship
between enrollment and per capita expendi-
tures largely has been erased. The effects for
boys and girls were the same.
Enrollment does not guarantee that a
child will continue in school throughout the
school year, nor does it mean that he or she
attends school regularly. To continue receiv-
ing the education transfers, RPS required
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38Although these bar charts are a convenient way of summarizing the program effects, it is not possible to inter-
pret the sum of the two parts of each column as the enrollment rate with the program. This is evident, for ex-
ample, in the subgroup of 9-year-olds, for whom the sum is an implausible 100 percent.
Table 4.8 RPS average effect on enrollment, children age 7–13 in first
to fourth grades
Survey round Intervention Control Difference
Follow-up 2002 92.7 79.2 13.5***
[795] [797] (2.6)
Follow-up 2001 93.2 74.0 19.2***
[821] [773] (3.1)
Baseline 2000 72.3 71.6 0.7
[851] [757] (4.1)
Difference 2001–2000 20.9*** 2.4 18.5***
(3.1) (2.1) (3.7)
Difference 2002–2000 20.4*** 7.6*** 12.8***
(3.5) (2.6) (4.3)
Source: Nicaraguan RPS evaluation data. 
Notes: Standard errors correcting for heteroskedasticity and allowing for clustering at the
comarca level are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001). Analysis based on all
children 7–13 years old who had not completed grade 4 in 706 households in the
intervention group and 653 households in the control group in each year (number
of children shown in brackets). Bold indicates significance at *** the 1 percent
level, ** the 5 percent level, and * the 10 percent level.that no enrolled student have six or more
unjustified absences in a 2-month period
(Table 2.2). The effect of the program on
current attendance was even larger than
that on enrollment, with an average program
effect of 20 percentage points for children
ages 7–13. The effect was significant for all
age groups except 12-year-olds. As with en-
rollment, the extremely poor and poor ben-
efited the most (Figure 4.5b). Nonetheless,
the non-poor also appear to have experi-
enced gains in current attendance (although
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Figure 4.4b RPS average effect (2000–02) on enrollment for 7- to 13-year-olds who had
not completed fourth grade, by poverty group and by sex














Extremely poor Poor Non-poor Girls Boys
Percent enrolled
Figure 4.4a RPS average effect (2000–02) on enrollment for 7- to 13-year-olds who had
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Percent enrolledgiven the small sample size these are less
precisely estimated). Boys benefited slightly
more than girls. There have been positive
effects even for those children who were at-
tending school prior to the program, as they
are now attending more regularly.
RPS had a massive effect on enrollment
and current attendance in the intervention
areas. Even though only about one-third of
the rural comarcas in each municipality were
included in Phase I, increases in enrollment
could be seen even in the aggregate munic-
ipal-level data compiled by the Ministry of
Education. In the six municipalities com-
bined, there was an increase of about 5 per-
centage points in enrollment in grades 1 to
4 between 1999 and 2000, before the pro-
gram. The increase was nearly 18 percentage
points between 2000 and 2001, far higher
than what occurred in the rest of the country
during that period.
Although schools were generally avail-
able in RPS program areas as a result of the
targeting described earlier, steps were taken
to accommodate the large changes in enroll-
ment as the program developed. The two
principal steps were increasing the number
of sessions per day and increasing the num-
ber of teachers. RPS also supported local
communities in their efforts to solicit ad-
ditional teachers from the Ministry of Edu-
cation. For most rural schools, this was a
straightforward process, because they operate
under an autonomous system with substan-
tial local control.39 In one RPS municipality
with a smaller proportion of autonomous
schools, however, it was more difficult to
increase the number of teachers. In some
cases, this problem was resolved when ben-
eficiary parents agreed, on the suggestion of
RPS, to contribute part of their transfers to
help pay for a new teacher for the first year.
In other cases, staffing problems were not
resolved. Possibly reflecting these problems,
enrollment rates were the lowest in this
municipality, although they were still 90
percent, on average. In sum, the overall
level of enrollment left little room for im-
provement, and supply does not appear to
have been a major constraint. This achieve-
ment, however, required active intervention
and coordination on the part of RPS. For
schooling outcomes, then, it is particularly
important to underscore that we interpret
the estimated effects as the combined effect
of demand- and supply-side components of
the program. Changes in control group en-
rollment call into question the validity of
the experiment for the reasons outlined in
Chapter 3. The observed increase of 7.6
percentage points was greater than the na-
tional rural average and appears to have
been the net effect of several factors pos-
sibly contaminating the controls, including
(1) increases in school feeding in the area
(described in the fourth section of Chapter
3), (2) possible crowding out at the school
level, (3) improvements in supply as a result
of the program, and (4) changes in expecta-
tions in the control group. The expansion
of school feeding may have spurred enroll-
ment rates (although there is little reason to
think the effects would not have been equal
in intervention and control comarcas). In a
small number of areas, individual schools
served students in both intervention and con-
trol comarcas. This is problematic for the
estimated effects because possible crowding
in schools may have led individuals in the
control group to be discouraged from at-
tending (although given the small number
this is unlikely to have been a large effect).
Offsetting this possible, but likely small,
effect, however, is that RPS induced an in-
crease in the supply of teachers and grades
offered in these municipalities (as described
earlier).
In the fourth section of Chapter 3, we
argued that the potential effects of expecta-
tions on control group schooling decisions
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39In the early 1990s, a school reform was undertaken to devolve control from the central government to local
schools or, in some rural areas, clusters of schools (King, Ozler, and Rawlings 1999).were ambiguous. Increasing enrollments,
however, suggest that these effects may
have been positive, on average. Enrollments
increased in the control group for every
age group except 13-year-olds, with the con-
sequence that reflexive first-difference ef-
fects over time are greater than the double-
difference estimator for every age group
younger than age 13. As a result, the largest
estimated double-difference effect was for
the oldest eligible age children, 13-year-
olds, because there were no increases in
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Figure 4.5b RPS average effect (2000–02) on current attendance for 7- to 13-year-olds
who had not completed fourth grade, by poverty group and by sex
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Figure 4.5a RPS average effect (2000–02) on current attendance for 7- to 13-year-olds
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Percent attendingenrollments in the control group for them. If
parents were acting strategically in anticipa-
tion of the program, they would have been
less likely, if anything, to change decisions
regarding these older children who would
be ineligible in the following year. We con-
clude that to the extent contamination exists
it is leading to an underestimation of the
effects of RPS on schooling.
The final aspect of the effect of RPS on
education we consider is grade advance-
ment or continuation rates—the percentage
of students in each grade who progressed
two grades during the two years of RPS op-
eration. Unlike the enrollment and current
attendance results just presented, the effect
of RPS on continuation rates is measured as
a first difference, since information at two
points in time is required to calculate pro-
gression. The estimated effect is the differ-
ence between the percentage of students
continuing in the intervention areas and the
percentage continuing in the control areas.
Overall, the effect is significant and shows
an average improved progression rate of 7.3
percentage points. Table 4.9 shows the re-
sults by starting grade in 2000. Although less
precisely estimated for these smaller sub-
groups, we still find significant effects for
those starting in grades 1 and 4. An unantic-
ipated benefit of the program was the large
effect on those making the transition from
third and fourth to fifth and sixth grades.
This effect was unanticipated, because en-
rollment in the fifth grade or higher was not
one of the conditions for continuing to re-
ceive the education transfer. Unfortunately,
it is not possible at present to determine
exactly why this is occurring. It may be
simply an income effect of the program. It
may also be due to potentially long-lasting
changes in attitudes toward education. Fi-
nally, it may merely reflect confusion about
the program requirements on the part of
beneficiaries, although this seems unlikely
given that Adato and Roopnaraine (2004)
find that beneficiaries understand them
well. Examining continuation rates for all
four grades at once for the different poverty
groups (Table 4.10) shows that, as with the
other measures, there is a tendency for the
largest effects of the program to be concen-
trated among the poorer households. Finally,
as with the other results, the effects were
similar for boys and girls.
Among those not enrolling, economic
reasons were cited in nearly half the cases,
and work was specifically cited in about 10
percent of the cases. For those who dropped
out during the year, work was cited as the
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Table 4.9 RPS average effect (2000–02) on school advancement,
children age 7–13 in first to fourth grades, by starting grade in 2000
Grade Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4
Intervention 92.7 89.7 84.7 86.8
[330] [156] [131] [114]
Control 84.8 84.3 76.2 77.5
[310] [178] [105] [89]
Difference 7.9*** 5.5 8.5 9.3**
(3.0) (3.8) (5.5) (5.3)
Source: Nicaraguan RPS evaluation data. 
Notes: Standard errors correcting for heteroskedasticity and allowing for clustering at the
comarca level are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001). Analysis based on all
children 7–13 years old who had not completed grade 4 in 2000 and are in the
sample in 2002. (Number of children shown in brackets.) Bold indicates signifi-
cance at *** the 1 percent level, ** the 5 percent level, and * the 10 percent level.THE EFFECTS OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS 43
40This finding, like the finding that boys were more likely to work than girls, may reflect in part how the ques-
tions about work were designed focusing on work outside the home.
main cause 20 percent of the time. The need
to work plays a role in schooling decisions,
although apparently not the dominant one.
We now examine whether the implemen-
tation of RPS reduced child labor for the
target school-age children.
Parents in beneficiary communities
unanimously expressed opposition to child
labor, although the realities of life often
require it (Adato and Roopnaraine 2004).
We consider a child to be working if work
was a primary or secondary activity, with
positive hours worked. Nearly all child
workers were agricultural laborers or un-
skilled helpers and typically worked with-
out pay. While children under age 10 rarely
reported working, from age 10 upward they
were increasingly likely to work; 45 percent
of 13-year-olds in the sample reported work-
ing. Average hours worked also increased
with age. There was no obvious monotonic
relationship, however, between working and
the economic well-being of the household.
This likely reflects the likelihood that child
labor increases household expenditures, our
measure of well-being. Boys were substan-
tially more likely to report working. By age
13, only one quarter of the girls reported
working compared to nearly 60 percent of
the boys. Conditional on working, boys also
worked longer hours, averaging 25 hours
per week compared to 16 hours for girls.
Given the questionnaire’s orientation toward
economically productive activities aside
from housework, the difference between
boys and girls’reported work may reflect in
part the underreporting of girls’ domestic
responsibilities.
For every age group, the percentage of
children working was lower after the pro-
gram. When we combine those children
ages 7–13 who had not completed the fourth
grade, the double-difference estimator shows
a 4.6 percentage point decrease in the per-
centage of children working in 2001 and a
5.6 percentage point decrease in 2002 (Table
4.11). In both the intervention and control
areas, the percentage of children working
declined significantly in 2001. This may
reflect the general economic downturn in
the program area with possibly suppressed
labor demand. Finally, while the effect on
education outcomes was the same for boys
and girls (as described earlier), the effect on
reported work for boys was more than twice
as large as for girls.40 As in the case of
Table 4.10 RPS average effect on school advancement,
children age 7–13 in first to fourth grades (2000–02), 
by poverty group
Group Extremely poor Poor Non-poor
Intervention 87.9 92.0 88.8
[322] [311] [74]
Control 82.4 82.4 82.4
[392] [216] [98]
Difference 5.5* 9.6*** 6.4
(3.0) (3.4) (5.9)
See notes for Table 4.9.PROGRESA(Skoufias and Parker 2001; de
Janvry et al. 2004; Schultz 2004), RPS has
shown that not only is schooling increased,





A necessary and central feature of the
growth monitoring and development pro-
gram (programa vigilancia y promoción del
crecimiento y desarrollo, hereafter VPCD)
for children is the monthly visit (for chil-
dren under age 2) and visits every other
month (for children ages 2–5) to an RPS
health-care provider. All beneficiaries
agreed that their children’s health improved
under the program and they were greatly
appreciative of the preventive health-care
services (Adato and Roopnaraine 2004).
Before the program, just over 70 percent of
children younger than age 3 had been taken
for a well-child check-up in the previous
6 months. In 2001, RPS produced a sig-
nificant average increase of 16.3 percentage
points in the percent of children younger
than age 3 whose parents had taken them for
a well-child visit in the past 6 months, but
an increase of only 8.4 percentages point in
2002 (Table 4.12).41This deterioration from
2001 to 2002 in the estimated effect was
largely due to continued improvement in
this indicator in the control group and re-
flects only a slight decline in intervention
areas (from 95.8 to 92.7 percent). Indeed,
during the period 2000–02, the percentage
taken to a health-care visit in the control
group increased by 10.5 percentage points.
The RPS effect on the percentage taken
to a health-care provider and weighed dur-
ing the visit in the last 6 months, another
key aspect of the VPCD program, was even
larger (Table 4.13). As noted earlier, there
was an increase in the control group from
2000 to 2002, of 15.2 percentage points, but
this change was swamped by a 28.3 per-
centage point change in the intervention
group, leading to a double-difference esti-
mated average effect of 13.1 percentage
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41We focus on children ages newborn to 3 years to cover the most vulnerable period in a child’s development, as
discussed in the fourth section of this chapter.
Table 4.11 RPS average effect on working, children age 7–13 in first
to fourth grades
Survey round Intervention Control Difference
Follow-up 2002 5.4 12.0 –6.6***
[795] [797] (2.2)
Follow-up 2001 5.0 10.6 –5.6***
[821] [773] (1.5)
Baseline 2000 12.7 13.7 –1.0
[851] [757] (2.5)
Difference 2001–2000 –3.1* –7.7*** –4.6*
(1.7) (2.2) (2.7)
Difference 2002–2000 –7.3*** –1.7 –5.6**
(2.0) (1.8) (2.7)
See notes for Table 4.8.points. Here again, an increase in the control
group explains in large part why the esti-
mated effect of the program dipped between
2001 and 2002.
As with the effects for expenditures
and schooling, average program effects for
VPCD measures are larger among poorer
households. Table 4.14 presents results by
poverty group for the two indicators just
discussed. It shows that average effects were
much larger among the extremely poor
and, at least in 2002, were not significantly
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Table 4.12 RPS average effect on percentage of children age
newborn to 3 years taken to health control in past 6 months
Survey round Intervention Control Difference
Follow-up 2002 92.7 84.1 8.6**
[276] [350] (3.5)
Follow-up 2001 95.8 79.4 16.4***
[336] [371] (5.2)
Baseline 2000 73.7 73.6 0.1
[369] [371] (6.0)
Difference 2001–2000 22.1*** 5.8 16.3**
(5.0) (5.3) (7.2)
Difference 2002–2000 19.0*** 10.5*** 8.4
(4.8) (3.6) (5.9)
Source: Nicaraguan RPS evaluation data. 
Notes: Standard errors correcting for heteroskedasticity and allowing for clustering at
the comarca level are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001). Analysis based on
all children newborn to 3 years old in 706 households in the intervention group
and 653 households in the control group in each year (number of children shown
in brackets). Bold indicates significance at *** the 1 percent level, ** the 5 per-
cent level, and * the 10 percent level.
Table 4.13 RPS average effect on percentage of children age
newborn to 3 years taken to health control and weighed in past
6 months
Survey round Intervention Control Difference
Follow-up 2002 89.0 75.6 13.5***
(4.2)
Follow-up 2001 92.0 67.4 24.6***
(5.7)
Baseline 2000 60.7 60.4 0.3
(8.3)
Difference 2001–2000 31.3*** 7.0* 24.2***
(6.1) (3.8) (7.1)
Difference 2002–2000 28.3*** 15.2*** 13.1*
(6.3) (4.2) (7.5)
See notes for Table 4.12.positive for the poor or non-poor. Most of
the non-poor already regularly took their
children to the health centers before the pro-
gram, and as a result, the estimated effects
for this group were small and insignificant.
An analysis contrasting the effects for girls
and boys shows that there were no differ-
ences by sex (IFPRI 2003).
In addition to these measures, a variety
of other process indicators related to the
VPCD visits for children younger than age
3 were examined, including whether the
child had a health card, the child’s weight
was graphed on the health card, the child’s
health card was up to date, and the child was
given vitamins in the last 6 months. All of
these showed patterns similar to the ones
just described (IFPRI 2003).
Even though the indicators agreed upon
by RPS and IADB (Appendix C) did not
include effects on children ages 3–5, the
program and program requirements do in-
clude children in this age range. Overall, the
results for all the indicators described for
this older age group show an even greater
effect than for those younger than 3 years
old (IFPRI 2003).
It is important to emphasize that for
most of the indicators considered, the con-
trol group also showed improvements over
the period, although on a smaller scale. A
possible explanation for this increase is that
other providers brought health-care services
into the areas not covered by the program
(the program providers did not offer or de-
liver services to non-beneficiaries in Phase I)
in response to the evaluation. In the fourth
section of Chapter 3, however, it was
demonstrated that there was no influx of
other health-care programs into control areas
over the period. A second possibility, un-
related to newly entering programs but still
explaining the increase in these indicators
in the control group, is that previous to the
program, these services would have been
offered by the existing (mostly government-
run) health posts and centers. With the
program, demand for such public services
dropped. As a result, it is likely that wait-
ing time diminished for those services, at
least at the outset—increasing demand for
them within the control group. Higher
utilization within the control group would
be the result. Afinal possibility is that house-
holds in the control group changed their be-
havior based on the expectations as discussed
in the fourth section of Chapter 3. For these
reasons,  double-difference estimates may
be downward biased, as evidenced by the
fact that the reflexive first-differences over
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Table 4.14 RPS average effect on percentage of children age
newborn to 3 years taken to health control and weighed in past
6 months, by poverty group
Group Extremely poor Poor Non-poor
Taken to health control
DD 2001–2000 17.5* 20.6** 6.6
(9.0) (8.8) (9.4)
DD 2002–2000 15.2* 6.5 –9.1
(8.3) (6.4) (8.6)
Weighed
DD 2001–2000 29.9*** 23.5*** 13.0
(9.6) (8.9) (12.1)
DD 2002–2000 18.8** 7.3 8.3
(9.5) (9.1) (13.1)
See notes for Table 4.12.time are consistently larger for the health
input indicators measured in this section.42
Vaccination for Children Ages
12–23 Months
A variety of indicators can be used to eval-
uate the effect of RPS on vaccinations. One
common indicator that summarizes the
overall situation is up-to-date vaccinations
for children ages 12–23 months.43The 1998
Demographic and Health Survey indicates
that coverage in rural areas of Nicaragua
according to this measure was 68 percent;
in the RPS baseline 2000 it was 40 percent,
reflecting the relative poverty of the pro-
gram areas.
RPS produced an insignificant average
net increase of 4.6 percentage points in up-
to-date vaccination levels between 2000 and
2002 (see Table 4.15). In contrast to many
of the other results, there was little difference
across poverty groups. Both intervention and
control groups improved tremendously be-
tween 2000 and 2001 but suffered setbacks
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42Another, related possibility is that RPS had a demonstration effect. Control and intervention comarcas are in
some cases adjacent to one another. Seeing the activity and the emphasis placed on the RPS objectives may lead
nonbeneficiaries to undertake behavior they would not have otherwise. Reasons for such actions could be many—
including the possibility that the individuals thought this was a way to become eligible for the program.
A final possibility is that respondents are overstating their attendance under an expectation that this may in-
fluence whether or not they receive RPS in the future. We have little direct evidence to confront these trends with,
except that in the following subsection we find that vaccinations (which are recorded after examining the child’s
health card) also go up, and falsification of those cards seems rather unlikely.
43According to the Nicaraguan Ministry of Health guidelines, a child ages 12–23 months should have (at least)
the following vaccines: (1) one dose of bacillus Calmette Guérin (BCG), (2) three doses of polio, (3) three doses
of either pentavalent or diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT), and (4) one dose of measles, mumps, and rubella
(MMR). We calculate whether they have completed the vaccine schedule to date, that is, given their current age
in months, calling this up-to-date vaccination. For children younger than age 18 months the DPT booster is not
required and is therefore not needed to be up to date; for those 18 months or older, it is.
Table 4.15 RPS average effect on percentage of children age 12–23
months with updated vaccination
Survey round Intervention Control Difference
Follow-up 2002 71.4 69.4 2.0
[91] [121] (6.0)
Follow-up 2001 81.9 72.8 9.1
[105] [114] (7.1)
Baseline 2000 38.9 41.5 –2.6
[139] [123] (9.2)
Difference 2001–2000 43.1*** 31.3*** 11.7
(7.1) (6.8) (9.8)
Difference 2002–2000 32.6*** 28.0*** 4.6
(7.2) (8.5) (11.0)
Source: Nicaraguan RPS evaluation data. 
Notes: Standard errors correcting for heteroskedasticity and allowing for clustering at
the comarca level are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001). Analysis based on
all children 12–23 months old in 706 households in the intervention group and
653 households in the control group in each year (number of children shown in
brackets). Bold indicates significance at *** the 1 percent level, ** the 5 percent
level, and * the 10 percent level.between 2001 and 2002. Control areas in-
creased 28.0 percentage points over the
period, offsetting nearly all of the 32.6 per-
centage point gain in the intervention areas
in the calculation of the double-difference.
These substantial gains are even more im-
pressive when contrasted with national
figures that show coverage in rural areas
declining from 68 percent in 1998 to 60
percent in 2001.
An obvious proximate reason for the
increased coverage in the control group is
their increased attendance at health-care
controls described in the previous section.
In addition, discussions with RPS revealed
that increased coordination with the Min-
istry of Health in the distribution of vac-
cines to RPS health providers in these
municipalities may have had an indirect
effect—possibly strengthening the actions
of the Ministry of Health or providing addi-
tional vaccines to the health posts serving
the control group. Similar results are found
for the complete vaccination at 24 months
indicator (IFPRI 2003).44 Once again, it is
likely that the double-difference estimates
are downward biased, and that the first-
differences over time may more accurately
reflect the effect of the program, even with
the variety of measurement problems de-
scribed in footnote 44. Given the municipal-
ity level trends, it is all but impossible to
avoid the conclusion that RPS had a large
and positive effect on vaccination rates in
the program areas.
Child Nutritional Status
In a separate interview module implemented
in 2000 and 2002 only, the RPS assessed the
nutritional status of all children younger than
age 5 in survey households, measuring their
height, weight, and hemoglobin.45 In this
section, we explore whether the improved
household diet found in the section on ex-
penditures, and the improved health-care
services just described (including the growth
and monitoring of children), have been ac-
companied by improvements in the nutri-
tional status of children younger than age 5,
as they were in PROGRESA (Behrman and
Hoddinott 2005). We first define the indi-
cators we use to measure child nutritional
status and their interpretation (height-for-
age, weight-for-height, weight-for-age, and
hemoglobin) and then describe the find-
ings, placing them in the context of both
Nicaragua and Central America, an analysis
made possible by the existence of compa-
rable data across countries.
In large part because they are growing
so quickly, young children have high nutri-
tional requirements. Unfortunately, the diet
commonly offered to young children in de-
veloping countries to complement breast
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44When contrasted with RPS administrative data on vaccinations for beneficiary children, which show coverage
of nearly 100 percent, the coverage reported in Table 4.15 and calculated for other vaccine measures are sub-
stantially lower. There are a number of reasons for the discrepancy: (1) the analyses in this report do not condi-
tion on being a beneficiary but only on living in an intervention community; (2) recall may not be complete and
accurate when the health card is unavailable during the interview; (3) even when provided, the health card may
be incorrect; and (4) due to the logistics of visiting communities, there is a small possibility of interviewing a
child just after she turns old enough for a certain vaccine but has not had another visit to the health-care provider
(it is prohibited to administer vaccines before the minimum age set by the Ministry of Health). When one con-
siders vaccine coverage for this group vaccine by vaccine, most are covered at 90 percent or above (IFPRI 2003);
only when all are considered together do the coverage rates dip. This could be consistent with minor errors as
described above. Finally, in addition to simply having been vaccinated, being vaccinated at the correct time is
important—late vaccinations can have deleterious consequences for effectiveness and the coverage of the popu-
lation as a whole (Bolton et al. 1998). Since we do not consider directly the date of vaccination, ignoring the
measurement concerns just outlined, these estimates tend to overestimate the overall coverage.
45The anthropometric indicators were calculated using EpiInfo v6.4c, eliminating all the observations that Epi-
Info indicated had an error in measurement.milk is of low quality (i.e., monotonous and
with low energy content and nutrient den-
sity) and, as a result, multiple nutrient defi-
ciencies are common. At the same time,
young children are very susceptible to in-
fections, because their immature immune
systems are unable to provide adequate pro-
tection. In developing countries, foods and
liquids are often contaminated and are thus
key sources of frequent infections. Infec-
tions reduce appetite, increase nutrient loss,
and increase metabolic demands. Finally,
in many societies, inadequate traditional
remedies for childhood infections, includ-
ing withholding of foods and breast milk,
are common. Thus infection and malnutri-
tion often reinforce each other. Focusing on
the nutritional status of children is a power-
ful way to assess the effects of RPS, in par-
ticular because improvements during this
vulnerable period persist throughout one’s
life and therefore have long-lasting positive
benefits (Martorell et al. 1995).
Severe protein–energy malnutrition pre-
sents itself as kwashiorkor and marasmus,
syndromes that are characterized by clinical
signs, marked metabolic disturbances, and
high fatality rates in the absence of high-
quality care (Waterlow 1992). Severe mal-
nutrition is rare, however, even in very poor
countries. Most malnutrition in children is
best described as mild to moderate and is
measured in terms of growth failure against
a standard reference population. Weight
and height are expressed as age-specific z-
scores46 and the criterion of a z-score of less
than –2 for height-for-age, weight-for-height,
and weight-for-age is commonly used to
identify stunting, wasting, and underweight,
respectively. The percentages of stunted and
underweight children are standard ways of
describing the extent of child malnutrition
in societies (UN ACC/SCN 2000). The fol-
lowing are the standard indicators.
Height-for-age reflects linear growth
before and after birth. A short stature refers
to short height-for-age that can reflect either
normal variation in growth or a develop-
mental deficit. This deficit or retardation in
growth is the cumulative effect of poor nu-
trition or inadequate health for an extended
period of time. Achild is considered to be in
deficit, or stunted, if his or her height-for-
age z-score (HAZ) is two or more standard
deviations (SD) below the median of the
international sex-specific reference popula-
tion of the National Center of Health Statis-
tics of the United States of America/World
Health Organization, referred to as “NCHS/
WHO” (WHO Expert Committee 1995).
Weight-for-height measures body weight
relative to stature and, similar to height-for-
age, a child is considered to be in deficit,
or wasted, if his or her weight-for-height
z-score (WHZ) is more than two standard
deviations below the median of the inter-
national reference population NCHS/WHO.
In general, this condition is the result of a
recent experience such as a severe lack of
food or serious illness, which causes sub-
stantial weight loss. It is also possible that
the deficit originates from chronic nutrition
deficiency or chronic illness.
Weight-for-age measures body mass rela-
tive to age. It is influenced both by stature
and weight of children and, therefore, when
there is a deficit, it is an indicator of both
retarded growth and of weight loss. For this
reason, it is difficult to interpret. When there
is no deficit in weight-for-height, weight-
for-age also indicates the accumulated ef-
fects of poor nutrition or health of an in-
dividual (or population), similar to the
interpretation for height-for-age. Weight-
for-age deficit is defined as weight-for-age
z-score (WAZ) more than two standard de-
viations below the median of the inter-
national reference population NCHS/WHO.
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46z-scores are used to normalize measured heights and weights against those found in well-nourished populations.
They are age- and sex-specific; for example, a z-score of height-for-age is defined as measured height minus me-
dian height of the reference population, all divided by the standard deviation for that age/sex category.The statistical prevalence expected for this
deficit, as well as for those for HAZ and
WHZ, is 2–3 percent in a healthy population.
Anemia is hemoglobin concentration
lower than a reference cutoff value. Anemia
can be caused by nutritional deficiencies of
iron, folic acid, vitamin B12, or other nutri-
ents. Diseases or hereditary disorders also
can cause anemia. Therefore, hemoglobin
as an indicator of iron deficiency has a low
specificity. It is, however, responsive to
improvements in iron intakes in deficient
populations, has a functional significance,
and is suitable for field settings. Low hemo-
globin in developing countries is a good in-
dicator of iron deficiency anemia. In this
analysis, we use the international suggested
cutoff point of 11.0 g/dL for children 6–59
months of age (UNICEF/UNU/WHO/MI
1999).
In 1965–67, Costa Rica had 27 percent
stunting (not shown). By 1982, the preva-
lence had fallen to 8 percent and stabilized
(see Table 4.16, HAZ). The case of Costa
Rica shows that it is possible to substan-
tially reduce malnutrition in a Central Amer-
ican country. Guatemala has the highest
malnutrition for children under age 5 in the
region; in 1998–9, 46 percent of its chil-
dren were stunted. Nevertheless, since 1987,
Guatemala has been reducing the preva-
lence slowly, at a rate of about 1 percent per
year. Honduras and El Salvador, however,
showed little progress over the same period.
Malnutrition levels in Nicaragua have
been stable, with little sign of improvement
since 1987. The prevalence of stunting for
1997–98 is low (25 percent showing retarded
growth) in comparison with Guatemala and
Honduras (36–40 percent), similar to El
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Table 4.16 Malnutrition in Central American countries
Percent Percent Percent
HAZ WAZ WHZ
Country and year n < < –2.0 SD < < –2.0 SD < < –2.0 SD
Costa Rica 1982 (0–71 months) 2,250 7.6 6.3 1.9
Costa Rica 1996 (12–83 months) 1,008 6.1 5.1 2.3
Guatemala 1987 (3–35 months) 2,229 57.7 33.2 1.3
Guatemala 1995 7,768 49.7 26.6 3.3
Guatemala 1998–99 3,591 46.4 24.2 2.5
Honduras 1987 3,244 37.2 20.6 1.7
Honduras 1991 5,961 36.3 18.0 1.5
Honduras 1993–94 (12–59 months) 1,875 39.6 18.3 2.0
Honduras 1996 1,307 38.9 25.4 1.4
Honduras PRAF 2000 (subnational) 5,563 52.8 27.7 1.3
Nicaragua 1993–94 3,546 22.5 11.0 1.9
Nicaragua 1997–98 6,497 24.9 12.2 2.2
Nicaragua RPS 2000 995 39.7 14.0 0.6
El Salvador 1988 2,039 29.9 15.2 —
El Salvador 1993 3,515 23.1 11.2 1.3
El Salvador 1998 6,523 23.3 11.8 1.1
Source: (http://www.who.int/nutgrowthdb), IFPRI (2001c), and Nicaraguan RPS evaluation data.
Notes: Percentages less than –2 SD below the mean of the international reference population NCHS/WHO
(WHO expert committee 1995) of children between newborn and 59 months (except where noted) in na-
tional surveys and the RPS surveys.Salvador (23–30 percent), and high in com-
parison to Costa Rica. Table 4.16 shows that
before the program 39.7 percent of children
younger than age 5 living in the RPS pro-
gram areas suffered from retarded growth
because of malnutrition or illness. This is 1.6
times greater than the national prevalence
for 1997–98 and nearly 20 times greater
than the statistically expected prevalence for
a healthy population. The areas where RPS
operates exhibited substantially higher mal-
nutrition than the national average. This is
attributable in part to the fact that, via tar-
geting, poverty levels are high in these areas.
In this respect, RPS is similar to PRAF,
where the level of stunting is also much
higher than the national average for Hon-
duras and where the children do not show
recent severe lack of food or serious illness
(0.6 percent in RPS with a WHZ more than
2 standard deviations below the norm). Fi-
nally, malnutrition increases with the sever-
ity of poverty within the RPS baseline 2000
sample, as well. The poorest 20 percent show
the highest levels of stunting. Less poor
households have lower malnutrition and the
best-off households in the program areas do
not show, on average, marked growth def-
icits, particularly the wealthiest 20 percent.
Table 4.17 shows the calculations of the
percentage of children younger than age 5
who were stunted. Before the program, in-
tervention and control areas showed similar
high rates of stunting. After 2 years of oper-
ation, stunting declined in the intervention
areas by 3.4 percentage points, and increased
by 2.2 percentage points in the control
areas. The average net effect of RPS was to
reduce stunting prevalence by 5.5 percent-
age points.
The current nutritional situation, as
measured by wasting, is not a major con-
cern in Nicaragua or in the program areas
and therefore it is not surprising that there
was no substantial change as a result of
RPS. As shown in Table 4.18, 0.2 percent
of children under age 5 were wasted in the
intervention and control areas in 2002.
With no evidence of wasting, weight-
for-age is best interpreted as an alternative
indicator of chronic malnutrition. Table 4.19
shows the effect of RPS on WAZ and, as ex-
pected, it is a pattern similar to that seen in
Table 4.17.
Before RPS, 13.7 percent of the children
younger than age 5 in the intervention areas
were underweight for their age. Two years
later, the prevalence of underweight children
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Table 4.17 RPS effect on percentage of children under age 5 who
are stunted (HAZ < < –2.00)
Survey round Intervention Control Difference
Follow-up 2002 36.5 41.7 –5.2
[469] [518] (4.7)
Baseline 2000 39.8 39.5 0.3
[512] [483] (4.9)
Difference 2002–2000 –3.4** 2.2 –5.5*
(1.3) (2.8) (3.0)
Source: Nicaraguan RPS evaluation data. 
Notes: Standard errors correcting for heteroskedasticity and allowing for clustering at
the comarca level are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001). Analysis based
on children newborn to 3 years in 706 households in the intervention group and
653 households in the control group in each year (number of children shown in
brackets). Bold indicates significance at *** the 1 percent level, ** the 5 per-
cent level, and * the 10 percent level.had declined by 3.9 percentage points; at the
same time, the prevalence increased by
about 2 percentage points in the control
areas. The net effect, then, was that RPS sig-
nificantly reduced the prevalence of under-
weight children by 6.2 percentage points.
In addition to examining prevalence rates
as in the previous tables, we can also mea-
sure program effects by considering the con-
tinuous measures of nutritional status upon
which the prevalence rates are based. We do
this for HAZ in Table 4.20, finding a net
average improvement attributable to RPS of
0.13, although it is not significant, likely a
result of the small sample.47 As with many
of the other indicators, the gains in nutrition
also appear to be concentrated among the
poor. The estimated double-difference effect
of the program on height-for-age z-scores
among the extremely poor is 0.22 and sig-
nificant at the 10 percent level (not shown).
In 2 years of operation, RPS has signifi-
cantly reduced stunting in children younger
than age 5.48 Because there are a variety of
possible program effects through which child
nutrition might improve—some of which
we have documented here, such as food ex-
penditures and the well-child health-care
visits—we claim only that child nutrition
improved as a result of the program; with-
out further analysis, we are unable to spec-
ify the specific channels through which this
was achieved.
The results from the two previous na-
tional Demographic and Health Surveys
(1998 and 2001) show that Nicaragua has
reduced stunting by about 1.5 percentage
points per year over three years. RPS, in
only 2 years, reduced it by 5.5 percentage
points, an annual rate of decline 1.7 times
larger than the national trend. Very few
programs in the world have been able to
rigorously demonstrate such a substantial
decrease in stunting in such a short time.
Iron deficiency anemia is a severe prob-
lem affecting the entire Central American
isthmus, where it is most severe in Guate-
mala (nearly 50 percent), Honduras, and El
Salvador. In 2000, 33 percent of children
6–59 months of age in RPS program areas
exhibited iron deficiency anemia. This is
substantially higher than the prevalence
found in a 1993 national survey in Nica-
ragua (28 percent), again likely reflecting
the RPS targeting of poorer than (national)
average areas. One feature of the RPS
VPCD was provision of iron supplements to
children. In Table 4.21, we show that the
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47When based on the unbalanced panel sample of households, the double-difference estimate is 0.15 and is sig-
nificant at the 10 percent level.
48We have also explored differences by sex in all the nutritional status indicators finding no statistical differences.
For that reason (and because of the small sample sizes), we do not present results separated by sex.
Table 4.18 RPS effect on percentage of children under age 5 who
are wasted (WHZ < < –2.00)
Survey round Intervention Control Difference
Follow-up 2002 0.2 0.2 0.0
(0.3)
Baseline 2000 0.8 0.4 0.4
(0.5)
Difference 2002–2000 –0.6 –0.2 –0.3
(0.5) (0.4) (0.6)
See notes for Table 4.17.program had an enormous effect on the per-
centage of mothers receiving ferrous sulfate
for their children in the past 4 months, as
measured in the anthropometric survey. The
double-difference estimated average effect
was 38.0 percent in 2002, despite a huge
increase in the control group as well.
This apparent success in distributing iron
supplements notwithstanding, however, after
2 years of operation, RPS had not suc-
ceeded in improving the grave situation on
anemia—the double-difference estimator
is positive, small, and insignificant (Table
4.22). Not surprisingly, the results for he-
moglobin mirror those for anemia—there
was no average program effect (Table 4.23).
Although Table 4.21 showed that twice
as many children in intervention areas had
received iron supplements in the last 4
months compared to control areas, it is
not possible to ascertain from these data
whether complete doses were received dur-
ing each VPCD visit, or whether the sup-
plements were actually ingested. Program
administration data show that there were se-
vere shortages of vitamins, iron supplements,
and antiparasite medicine during 2001, so
it is likely that complete supplements were
not received at each visit. Unfortunately,
this is something that the 4-month reference
period for the survey question on supple-
mentation delivery would not reflect. Short-
ages and inconstant or incomplete delivery
to children present one possible reason for
the failure to improve hemoglobin in the
population, as well as the fact that even
though the program effect was massive,
fully one fifth of the children younger than
age 5 in the intervention areas had not re-
ceived a supplement in the past 4 months.
Another possibility is that children are
deficient in other micronutrients, potentially
limiting the hematological response to iron
supplementation. Allen et al. (2002) failed
THE EFFECTS OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS 53
Table 4.19 RPS effect on percentage of children under age 5 who are
underweight (WAZ < < –2.00)
Survey round Intervention Control Difference
Follow-up 2002 9.8 16.6 –6.8**
(3.0)
Baseline 2000 13.7 14.3 –0.6
(2.7)
Difference 2002–2000 –3.9** 2.3 –6.2**
(1.6) (2.0) (2.5)
See notes for Table 4.17.
Table 4.20 RPS effect on HAZ for children younger than age 5
Survey round Intervention Control Difference
Follow-up 2002 –1.63 –1.80 0.17
[1.13] [1.20] (0.13)
Baseline 2000 –1.73 –1.77 0.04
[1.12] [1.17] (0.13)
Difference 2002–2000 0.10** –0.03 0.13
(0.05) (0.07) (0.09)
See notes for Table 4.17.54 CHAPTER 4
Table 4.21 RPS average effect on percentage of children age 
6–59 months given iron supplement (ferrous sulfate) in past 4 months
Survey round Intervention Control Difference
Follow-up 2002 79.8 37.9 41.9***
[431] [470] (4.6)
Baseline 2000 24.8 20.9 3.9
[475] [446] (6.0)
Difference 2002–2000 55.0*** 17.0*** 38.0***
(5.1) (3.0) (5.9)
Source: Nicaraguan RPS evaluation data. 
Notes: Standard errors correcting for heteroskedasticity and allowing for clustering at the
comarca level are shown in parentheses (StataCorp 2001). Analysis based on chil-
dren newborn to 3 years in 706 households in the intervention group and 653 house-
holds in the control group in each year (number of children shown in brackets).
Bold indicates significance at *** the 1 percent level, ** the 5 percent level, and
* the 10 percent level.
Table 4.22 RPS effect on percentage of children age 6–59 months
with anemia
Survey round Intervention Control Difference
Follow-up 2002 33.3 30.9 2.4
(5.8)
Baseline 2000 32.7 33.0 –0.3
(3.9)
Difference 2002–2000 0.5 –2.1 2.7
(0.5) (0.5) (6.7)
See notes for Table 4.21.
Table 4.23 RPS effect on average hemoglobin for children age 
6–59 months
Survey round Intervention Control Difference
Follow-up 2002 11.2 11.5 –0.3
(1.3) (1.4) (0.2)
Baseline 2000 11.4 11.4 0.0
(1.4) (1.5) (0.1)
Difference 2002–2000 –0.2 0.1 –0.2
(0.2) (0.1) (0.2)
See notes for Table 4.21.to find an improvement in hemoglobin in
Mexican children ages 18–36 months sup-
plemented with iron over 12 months in a
controlled experiment. They conclude that
the failure of the treatment could not be
attributed to failure to take the supplement,
inadequate length of supplementation, or
inadequate absorption of the iron provided.
Probably the most important factor in
RPS, however, is whether children were ac-
tually ingesting the supplements. This latter
possibility was pursued in the qualitative
study. It found that mothers knew the sup-
plements were important for their children’s
health. Most even said that they administer
them, but in reality this appears not to be the
case (or to be only sporadic). They offered a
variety of reasons for not doing so after
probing, however, including: children did
not like the taste, it caused vomiting or diar-
rhea, and it stained their teeth (Adato and
Roopnaraine 2004).
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Conclusions
T
his report has presented the main findings of a quantitative evaluation of a randomized
community-based intervention, RPS, against its primary objectives. Where possible,
we err on the side of assessing what are the short-term effects of the program in con-
servative manners, for example, by presenting intent-to-treat estimates and in the treatment of
possible contamination and attrition. The estimates presented represent the effect of the pro-
gram as a whole, in particular combining supply- and demand-side components. They also
represent only the short-term effects of the program (after 1 or 2 years), although some of the
outcomes examined are themselves long-run indicators. In many instances, for example, when
assessing the effects on expenditures during what turned out to be an economic downturn, the
critical importance of having baseline data and a control group for the evaluation was evident
—without one it would have been next to impossible to make reliable assessments of the pro-
gram effects. Even with one, it was at times difficult to make certain assessments of effects for
some indicators since the evaluation did not exist in a vacuum, and a variety of actors not
under the control of the program continued to operate in the program areas.
Overall, we found that RPS had positive (i.e., favorable) and significant double-difference
estimated average effects on a broad range of indicators and outcomes. Where it did not, it was
often because of similar, although smaller, improvements in the control group, which were
likely to have been influenced in part by the program itself. Nearly all estimated effects were
larger for the extremely poor, often reflecting their lower starting points (e.g., percentage of
children enrolling before the program). Among poorer beneficiaries there was simply more
potential for improvement on many of the indicators. As a result, the program has reduced
inequality of these outcomes across expenditure classes.
During Phase I, RPS supplemented per capita annual total household expenditures by 18
percent, on average. For beneficiary households, this increase compensated for the large in-
come loss experienced by non-beneficiaries during this period, while producing a small over-
all increase in expenditures. Most of the increase in expenditures was spent on food; the pro-
gram resulted in an average increase of C$640 (US$50) in per capita annual food expenditures
and an improvement in the diet of beneficiary households. Expenditures on education also
increased significantly, although there was no discernible effect on other types of investment
expenditures. Labor market participation was apparently little changed with the program over
time, although there was an indication of slightly fewer hours worked by men in the last week,
relative to the control group. The economic difficulties experienced by these communities
enabled RPS to operate somewhat like a traditional social safety net, aiding households dur-
ing a downturn. For schooling, RPS produced a large average net increase on enrollment of
12.8 percentage points and an even larger effect of 20 percentage points on current attendance
for the target population. Examining the number of children in grades 1–4 who advanced two
56grades between 2000 and 2002, RPS led to
an average increase of 7.3 percentage points,
despite the fact that advancement past grade
4 was not a formal requirement of the pro-
gram. In tandem with the increased school-
ing, the percentage of children 7–13 years
working declined by 5.6 points.
For child health care, RPS induced an av-
erage net increase of 16.3 percentage points
in the participation of children younger
than age 3 in VPCD but the effect was only
8.4 percentage points (and insignificant) in
2002 since participation by control group
households increased substantially. The
health-care services provided by the pro-
gram, as measured by process indicators in-
cluding whether the child was weighed and
whether his or her health card was updated,
improved even more. Participation by chil-
dren ages 3–5 also increased substantially.
Although it is not possible to statistically
demonstrate that RPS increased vaccination
coverage for children ages 12–23 months in
the intervention group (relative to the con-
trol group), it was demonstrated that vacci-
nation rates climbed 30 percentage points in
the intervention and control areas at a time
when they were, on average, decreasing in
rural areas nationally. One would be hard
pressed not to attribute this substantial im-
provement in large part to RPS.
Finally, the more varied household diet
and increased use of preventive health-care
services for children have been accompanied
by an improvement in the nutritional status
of beneficiary children younger than age 5.
The net effect was a 5.5 percentage point
decline in the number of children who were
stunted. This decline was 1.7 times faster
than the rate of annual improvement seen at
the national level between 1998 and 2001.
Very few programs in the world have shown
such a decrease in stunting in such a short
time. Despite improvements in the distribu-
tion of iron supplements to these same chil-
dren, however, RPS was unable to improve
hemoglobin levels or lower rates of anemia.
In related work, Caldés and Maluccio
(2005) analyze program and non-program
costs for RPS, including costs for design,
planning, and execution of the program in
the evaluation areas and everywhere else it
was operating (see Appendix A). While they
were unable to separate out program costs
pertaining to the households evaluated in
this report, they present a number of find-
ings relevant to this study. In particular, they
found that administrative costs were a little
less than 20 percent in the pilot phase, after
taking out fixed costs associated with de-
sign, planning, and evaluation. These were
higher than the costs for PROGRESA or
PRAF (Caldés, Coady, and Maluccio 2004),
although the difference appears to be due
to RPS’s complicated design (with an in-
volved supply-side component that the other
two programs did not have), pilot nature, and
its small size, particularly in comparison to
PROGRESA. Furthermore, RPS arguably
had the most impressive effects (Rawlings
and Rubio 2005).
Nearly half of the costs were due to a
number of special program features that are
hallmarks of conditional cash transfer pro-
grams, in particular targeting, monitoring and
conditioning, and coordinating the health-
care supply. Removing these costs would
reduce the administrative costs substantially,
but it is not possible to determine by how
much it would reduce the effectiveness of the
program—indeed their removal could rep-
resent a false savings (Caldés and Maluccio
2005).
The findings presented here played an
important role in the decision in late 2002
by the Government of Nicaragua and IADB
to continue and expand this effective pro-
gram as RPS–Mi Familia, Phase II.49 In
the expansion, the program was altered in
three important ways. First, the health-care
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49The program was transferred within the Nicaraguan government from FISE to the Ministry of the Family (Mi
Familia) in Phase II.services were expanded to benefit additional
household members, in particular with pre-
natal services for pregnant women, vaccina-
tions for 6- to 9-year-olds, and preventive
health care for adolescents and for all women
age 20 and older. Second, initially designed
as a 3-year program with both demand- and
supply-side components lasting for 3 years,
the supply-side components of the program
(in particular the health-care services and
the teacher transfer) were extended in Phase
II to last for a total of 5 years, such that in
the final 2 years participants would receive
supply-side benefits only. Third, based on
evidence of the effectiveness of the program
and cost considerations, the transfer size was
reduced by one-third.
RPS has improved a number of the indi-
cators included in the Nicaraguan national
poverty reduction strategy, during a time in
which many of them are not on track to
achieve the goals set out in the plan to 2015
(World Bank 2003). RPS demonstrates that
it is possible in Nicaragua, as it has been in
Mexico and other places, to combine short-
term reduction in rural poverty with im-
provements in human capital of children.
The evidence from the evaluation strongly
suggests that if the program were expanded
elsewhere in poor rural areas of Nicaragua
(as it was in 2003), it would be effective, al-
though due to the caveats discussed through-
out this report, we stop short of saying it
would necessarily be equally as effective.
Nonetheless, it could prove to be an im-
portant component of Nicaragua’s overall
poverty reduction policy.
A crucial question that the current eval-
uation was unable to answer is whether the
effects documented here will persist after
the program exits, and whether there are
longer-term effects that have not been cap-
tured in what is only a short-term, 2-year
evaluation. In late 2003, RPS delivered the
final demand-side transfers in the original
intervention areas, although it is scheduled
to continue offering health-care services and
teacher transfers until the end of 2005. Con-
tinued survey work in these areas will pro-
vide some of the information necessary to
examine the effects of that transition, and
begin to understand better the sustainability
of the large changes achieved by RPS.
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Descriptive Chronology of RPS Program
Activities in Phase I
T
he following is a descriptive timeline of the major activities undertaken during the pilot
phase (Phase I) of RPS, constructed in conjunction with RPS staff. We start with the
formal beginning of the program, disregarding the substantial planning efforts carried
out before that time by the IADB team and the eventual director to prepare the loan proposal
and any consultancies including the targeting strategy presented in Arcia (1999).
RPS was initiated in the final 2 months of 1999 with five full-time employees and the
director. Even with substantial advance planning, at the outset there was still much to be done
before RPS could become operational. Nearly all the effort and resources during those 2
months were devoted to writing the program’s operational guidelines, preparing the contrac-
tual arrangements necessary to hire central and local office staff, and designing the terms of
reference for the program evaluation. Finally, there was an effort to generate social and polit-
ical support through advocacy and public advertising campaigns, useful for any new program
but perhaps especially important for a program involving cash transfers, such as RPS.
In 2000, the first full year of operations, there were a number of activities associated with
institutional strengthening, including selecting and training an experienced professional team
in both the central and regional offices. By the end of the year, RPS had 37 persons on staff in
the central office in Managua and 12 in the regional offices. This team designed informational
materials for program beneficiaries, operational manuals for program counterparts (e.g., pro-
viders of health and education services), the accounting system, and the information system.
The latter comprises a continuously updated, relational database of beneficiaries, health-care
providers, and schools. The MIS was used to (1) select beneficiaries and prepare invitations to
program incorporation assemblies, (2) calculate transfer amounts, (3) compile requests to the
Ministry of Health for vaccines and other materials, and (4) monitor whether both beneficiaries
and health-care service providers are meeting their respective responsibilities. Substantial time
was dedicated to designing data forms for the various program participants that feed this sys-
tem (including the household registry or census forms, school forms, and health-care provider
forms that are all sent to the main office where they were entered into the computer). In con-
junction with IFPRI, RPS also estimated and calibrated an econometric model to be used for
household targeting in the second stage of Phase I.
Another important activity started in 2000 was the census implemented in the program
areas. After designing a two-page questionnaire (to be used in all the comarcas) that would
serve both as a registry and as an input into the household targeting decisions, RPS contracted
the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses to implement it for all households living in the
42 geographically targeted comarcas to identify potential beneficiaries and construct a registry
59of them. This was first done in March and
April 2000 with follow-up fieldwork in
September and October. Citing coordination
problems and concerns over data quality
and coverage (part of the reason that a second
round of fieldwork was necessary was that
households had been missed), RPS itself
carried out the census in 17 comarcas in
which household targeting was to be im-
plemented, in January and March 2001, and
thereafter internalizing this part of the oper-
ation. The next main activity in 2000 was
the preparation and implementation of the
beneficiary-incorporation assemblies. Once
beneficiaries had been identified and inte-
grated into the database, they were invited
in groups of 30 or fewer to assemblies typi-
cally held in the local school to be given the
opportunity to participate and to be informed
about the objectives of the program and
their rights and duties as participants. About
6,000 households were incorporated into
the program at the end of 2000; these are the
beneficiaries living in the 21 geographically
targeted comarcas sampled and studied in
this report. An additional 4,000 beneficiaries
were incorporated in mid-2001 (but are not
included in the impact evaluation), using
household targeting methods. After each
incorporation, the volunteer representatives
had to be selected and trained.
Another important set of activities in
2000 was related to program evaluation. The
second tranche of the IADB loan and ex-
pansion of the project to Phase II were con-
tingent upon various external evaluations,
including an impact evaluation, a targeting
evaluation, a beneficiary opinion survey,
and an institutional evaluation. In conjunc-
tion with IFPRI, planning for the first two
was completed in 2000 and the first baseline
survey, similar in design to an LSMS survey,
was carried out in the 42 intervention and
control comarcas in August and September
2000, before the program started (IFPRI
2001a, 2001b). Two follow-up surveys were
carried out in October 2001 and October
2002 (IFPRI 2003).
As designed, a normal year of demand-
side operations in RPS includes six cash
transfers (every 2 months) to households.
In 2000, however, because the program was
just beginning, only two transfers took place
in the latter part of the year. In 2001, which
can be considered a more operationally nor-
mal year, five of the scheduled six cash
transfers were made. Finally, in 2002, owing
to budget delays associated with the expan-
sion loan, again five of the six transfers
originally planned were made. Aside from
the design of the monitoring system, there
were no other activities associated with
conditionality in 2000; these began in 2001
a few months after the transfers were first
delivered and continued from then on.
The supply-side intervention of the
program for the health component consists
of the delivery of health-care services and
workshops by private health-care providers.
Payments for the services were supposed to
occur each month, but because of the nec-
essary preparation (such as designing the
services and terms of references and con-
tracting providers), implementation of this
component was delayed and in 2001 only
two transfers were made. Therefore, for sup-
ply of health-care services, 2001 cannot be
considered a normal operational year. In
2002, 11 payments were made and only the
payment for December is missing from the
accounting data.
Finally, during both 2001 and 2002, a
significant amount of time was devoted to
planning the expansion phase, redesigning
some program components as well as ne-
gotiating with government officials and fi-
nancing institutions. Also in late 2002, the
program was transferred from FISE to the
Ministry of the Family (Mi Familia), in
charge of social protection of vulnerable
groups in Nicaragua.
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Household Targeting in Geographically
Targeted Areas
A
fter implementing a registry census in May 2000 (known as the RPS population cen-
sus I), RPS excluded a small percentage of households who, even though they were
verified to be living in the geographically targeted rural areas, appeared not to be ex-
tremely poor. This decision was taken, in part, because the intervention areas had 6,000 house-
holds, substantially more than 5,000, the planned number of beneficiaries in the program during
the first stage of Phase I. Households satisfying one or both of the following were excluded:
1. Own a vehicle, truck, pickup truck, or jeep
2. Own more than 20 manzanas (14.1 hectares) of land
Based on these criteria, a total of 169 households (2.9 percent of the households living in
the intervention areas as reported in the May 2000 RPS census population) were excluded from
the program. None of these households, however, were drawn in the random sample for the base-
line survey. In addition to these households, 219 (3.8 percent) households were excluded after
the orientation assemblies and program registration for one or more of the following reasons:
1. Household comprising a single man or woman who was not disabled
2. Household with significant economic resources or a business
3. Household that omitted or falsified information during the RPS population census
Thirty-seven households from this category were included in the random sample for the base-
line survey.
Finally, 240 (4.2 percent) households did not attend the orientation assembly and/or chose
not to participate. Thus in the first stage of Phase I, the program excluded a total of 628 (10.9
percent) of the 5,741 rural households interviewed in the RPS population census of May 2000.
An additional 882 households were included as beneficiaries when it was discovered that the
May 2000 RPS population census had missed 949 households in the targeted areas. These
were integrated into the registry during the RPS population census II carried out in September
2000 and described in IFPRI (2001b). These households were not included in the original sam-
ple frame for the evaluation survey and thus are not included in the evaluation. An examina-
tion of their characteristics (collected in the RPS population census) shows that on average
they tended to have fewer resources than the households included in the evaluation survey.
Since most of the program effects were larger for the less well off, their exclusion from the
evaluation is likely to make the average estimated effects smaller (or more conservatively es-
timated), although probably not by very much since they represent only about 15 percent of
households in the area.
61APPENDIX C
Contractual Indicators for One-Year RPS
Evaluation in IADB Loan Contract
Indicator Goal
1. Percentage of children under age 3 who participate  An increase of more than 10 percentage points in 
in the growth and development monitoring  the intervention group over the control group
program (VPCD)
2. Percentage of children between 12 and 23 months  An increase of more than 10 percentage points in 
of age who have received all necessary vaccinations the intervention group over the control group
according to Ministry of Health guidelines
3. Percentage of households that have increased  Observe the tendency of the change (changed from 
spending on food, as a fraction of the total  original: An increase of more than 10 percentage 
household expenditures points in the intervention group over the control
group)
4. Percentage of children in the first through fourth  An increase of more than 10 percentage points in 
grades who continue in school the intervention group over the control group
5. Percentage of children in the first through fourth  An increase of more than 8 percentage points in  
grades who have matriculated in school the intervention group over the control group
(changed from the original: 5 percentage points)
6. Percentage of households included in the program More than 70 percent
that are extremely poor
7. Percentage of households included in the program Less than 30 percent
that are not extremely poor
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